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Abstract
Assisted reproductive technology ("ART"), including egg donation, is changing the topography of the
American family. Heated debates and legislative battles over cloning and stem cell research reveal the
complexity of the moral, scientific, and legal implications of emerging alternative reproductive methods. In
fact, the field of reproductive medicine is the "Wild West" of the healthcare world where technological
development is testing the boundaries of science and ethics. The legal and ethical issues intrinsic to the
evolution of the egg donation industry are poised to become central topics of public debate as we, as a culture,
reevaluate who and what constitutes a "parent" or "child," whether a human egg is a commodity, and what
privacy and medical confidentiality mean relative to the right to know one's genetic make-up. Largely
unregulated and untested in court, egg donation spawns a multitude of unanswered legal questions that will
inevitably begin to emerge sometime very soon. Litigation in this field is looming. For lack of precedent,
conclusions are reached by comparison to the analogous legal issues surrounding adoption, surrogacy, sperm
donation, and blood donation, as well as the social trends implied by tangential precedent. Section I reviews
the very limited history of litigation in which egg donation was a factor, the comparably scarce state and
federal regulation of egg donation, and the case and statutory law covering analogous legal topics. Part II.A
explores whether liability could attach under a product liability theory while Part II. B examines an egg
donor’s potential liability for latent genetic disease inherited by the egg donation child under a negligence
theory. Part III offers recommendations for regulating egg donation in order to prevent suits similar to those
described in the comment. The comment argues that the burden of care should rest on the fertility clinic
doctors and the egg donation agencies to properly screen egg donors.
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INTRODUCTION 
Assisted reproductive technology (“ART”),1 including egg 
donation,2 is changing the topography of the American family.3  
Heated debates and legislative battles over cloning and stem cell 
research reveal the complexity of the moral, scientific, and legal 
implications of emerging alternative reproductive methods.4  In fact, 
the field of reproductive medicine is the “Wild West” of the 
healthcare world where technological development is testing the 
boundaries of science and ethics.5
 1. ART encompasses all asexual human reproduction, including in vitro 
fertilization (“IVF”), sperm donation and artificial insemination (when coupled with 
female fertility treatment), and others.  It generally involves surgical removal of eggs 
from the ovaries of an intending mother (the woman intending to raise an ART 
child, see infra note 15 and accompanying text), or an egg donor, fertilization outside 
the intending mother or surrogate’s womb with the intending father or sperm 
donor’s sperm, and the implantation of the fertilized embryo(s) back into the womb 
of the intending mother, or gestational surrogate, who then carries the fetus to term.  
See infra note 2 (discussing egg donation procedures and IVF).  See generally AM. SOC’Y 
FOR REPROD. MED., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES:  A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 3–
17 (2003) (explaining in vitro fertilization and other forms of ART that have become 
accepted medical treatments for infertility). 
A “traditional surrogacy” involves the insemination of a surrogate mother, not the 
intending mother, using the surrogate’s own eggs to conceive a child for the 
intending mother.  A “gestational surrogate,” however, has no genetic relationship to 
the child she births.  Her pregnancy results from an in vitro fertilization implantation 
using the intending mother or egg donor’s fertilized eggs.  A surrogate surrenders 
the child to the intending mother at its birth.  See Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, 
Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents in Contested Surrogacy Births, 77 
A.L.R.5TH 567, 574 (2000) (distinguishing the two types of surrogacy). 
 2. Human egg donation—also known as oocyte, female gamete, ovum, and ova 
donation—involves the maturation of eggs in the donor using fertility drugs.  The 
eggs are then surgically removed from the donor’s ovaries through vaginal 
aspiration, then fertilized in a lab, and resulting embryos are inserted into the 
recipient or intending mother’s womb.  The IVF procedure is this “test-tube” 
fertilization and subsequent implantation of the eggs into the intending mother or 
surrogate.  Egg donation is thus the substitution of a donor’s eggs for the intending 
mother’s eggs in an otherwise standard IVF procedure.  See AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. 
MED., THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION (SPERM, EGG AND EMBRYO DONATION AND 
SURROGACY):  A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 3–9 (2006) (explaining the processes of egg 
donation and embryo transfer in greater detail). 
 3. See Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics:  The Fragmentation of 
the Ideology of the Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 563 (2000) (discussing the conflict 
between traditional notions of family and the realities of modern families, which are 
frequently formed by elective reproduction). 
 4. See, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold, Embryonic Stem Cell Research:  Old Controversy; New 
Debate, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Oct. 2004, at 4 (noting that President 
George W. Bush’s move to cut federal funding for embryonic stem cell research was 
a compromise that left every side frustrated). 
 5. See LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE, at xviii (Alfred A. Knopf 2007) 
(revealing that “[t]here is some truth” to the popular notion that those working in 
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Our society is still in the adolescence—or even infancy—of ART.  
The legal and ethical issues intrinsic to the evolution of the egg 
donation industry are poised to become central topics of public 
debate as we, as a culture, reevaluate who and what constitutes a 
“parent” or “child,”6 whether a human egg is a commodity,7 and what 
privacy and medical confidentiality mean relative to the right to know 
one’s genetic make-up.8  Of course, arguments over reproduction are 
not new for a country more than arguably still reeling from Roe v. 
Wade,9 but the violent battles to be fought over emerging 
reproductive technology may well overshadow those accompanying 
the abortion issue.10
Largely unregulated and untested in court,11 egg donation spawns a 
multitude of unanswered legal questions that will inevitably begin to 
emerge sometime very soon.  Litigation in this field is looming.  The 
numbers alone make conflict inevitable:  at least 8,075 egg donation 
procedures resulting in live births were completed in the 1990s, and 
those children are now at least preteens, if not young adults.12  As the 
the field of ART are “rogue scientists and multimillionaire doctors willing to stuff 
pretty much anything into a woman’s expensively prepped womb.”). 
 6. For a well articulated discussion of some of the parentage questions looming 
larger as ART becomes more common, see id. at 20–21, listing some of the relevant 
questions: 
How much do genetic progenitors matter?  Does a child who grows up 
father-free—or any child conceived through donated sperm or egg—have 
the right, or the need, to know the identity of the donor who helped bring 
him into being? . . . Do they need to know the truth?  Do they need to know 
the donor? 
 7. See infra Part II.A (analyzing whether human eggs should be considered 
commodities for the purpose of applying principles of product liability, tort and 
contract law). 
 8. See Janet Leach Richards & Sheryl Wolf, Medical Confidentiality and Disclosure of 
Paternity, 48 S.D. L. REV. 409, 427 (2003) (recognizing that “[t]he enactment of 
legislation permitting adult adoptees to open their sealed adoption records indicates 
a trend towards acknowledgement of a person’s right to know their biological make-
up”).  See generally Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution:  
The Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150 (1999) (considering the 
passage of statutes in several states that allow adult adoptees to obtain adoption 
records upon request and without a judicial hearing). 
 9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (controversially legalizing abortion). 
 10. See MUNDY, supra note 5, at xiv–xx, 19–23 (contrasting infertility treatment 
with abortion because “the spectacle of someone trying to have a child can be even 
more inflammatory than the spectacle of someone trying not to have one”). 
 11. See infra Section I.B–C (examining the judicial history relating to and 
regulation of egg donation). 
 12. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began publishing annual 
reports in 1996, detailing the success rates of various ART procedures, under the 
mandate of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 201 (1992).  This statute requires fertility clinics to report ART data, which is 
accumulated, analyzed and published in annual reports.  42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1, 263a-5.  
The number of live births from egg donation procedures is not well-documented; 
the ART reports start at 1995 and not all fertility clinics have reported their success 
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new generation of children conceived with eggs donated by 
strangers13 matures, adult-onset diseases will begin to emerge and 
cases will almost undoubtedly reach the courts seeking resolution of 
who should bear the burden and the blame, and what degree of care 
is owed to people who may be genetically related to you, but are most 
definitely not in your family.14  Distinct from malpractice suits against 
fertility doctors, egg donors will face potential liability for 
imperfections passed through their genes because some parents of 
egg donation children, known as intending or recipient parents,15 will 
feel cheated by the donors from whom they “bought” eggs at great 
expense.16  The children themselves will want and may need to know 
rates.  See infra Section I.C (discussing the lack of government regulation of fertility 
clinics).  Nonetheless, even these approximations serve to demonstrate the 
increasing importance of ART, and egg donation specifically.  For further discussion 
of ART procedures, including success rates and other statistics, see Assisted 
Reproductive Technology:  All Reports, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ARTReports.htm 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2008). 
 13. Not all ovum donors are—or remain—anonymous, but the vast majority 
choose not meet the recipient(s).  E.g., Andrew W. Vorzimer, The Egg Donor and 
Surrogacy Controversy:  Legal Issues Surrounding Representation of Parties to an Egg Donor 
and Surrogacy Contract, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 415, 427 (1999) (estimating that ninety 
percent of egg donors are effectively anonymous).  For a brief explanation of why 
donors and recipients tend to prefer anonymity in egg donation transactions, see 
Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs:  Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 
BYU L. REV. 107, 116–17 (examining the complications interpersonal relationships 
can create in such situations). 
For a fascinating discussion of one woman’s extensive experience as an egg donor, 
see generally JULIA DEREK, CONFESSIONS OF A SERIAL EGG DONOR (2004), in which the 
author, who donated her eggs a total of twelve times, describes her motivations, 
experiences and the psychological care required for her to distance herself from any 
children born to recipient couples from her eggs. 
 14. By comparison, the first “generation” of children conceived through sperm 
donation and artificial insemination are now reaching adulthood, and a significant 
number are demanding information about their genetic fathers.  See Paula J. 
Manning, Baby Needs a New Set of Rules:  Using Adoption Doctrine To Regulate Embryo 
Donation, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 677, 679 (2004) (arguing that legislative reforms 
granting children conceived with anonymously donated sperm the right to access 
their genetic father’s medical information should be extended to children born 
using anonymously donated embryos). 
 15. An intending couple or parent is the party that initiates the creation of a 
child, including through surrogacy or egg donation, with the intention of assuming 
legal responsibility for the child and raising it as their own.  See generally Campbell, 
supra note 1, at 567 (discussing the development of the “intent test” for determining 
parentage in the era of ART). 
 16. Typical egg donation fees range between $5,000 and $7,000, but the full cost 
of fertility treatment with IVF and donated eggs ranges between $10,000 and at least 
$30,000.  See infra Part II.A (exploring the potential liability arising out of the sizable 
and controversial compensation ovum “donors” receive); see also Pamela D. 
Bridgewater, Reconstructing Rationality:  Towards a Critical Economic Theory of 
Reproduction, 56 EMORY L.J. 1215, 1225 (2007) (noting the “astronomical” out-of-
pocket costs associated with egg donation, “rang[ing] from $7,000 to $20,000 per 
cycle”). 
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who they are genetically.17  They may feel they should have been 
warned, however many years have passed. 
The issues raised in egg donor tort liability cases will be of first 
impression in all jurisdictions, and they will include questions about 
the rights and responsibilities egg donors owe their genetic offspring.  
At least some of these cases will likely make it to trial.  In anticipation, 
this Comment seeks prospectively to answer the question of whether 
an egg donor owes a continuing duty to warn such genetic offspring 
if, after the birth of these children, she discovers she has a hereditary 
genetic disease that may have passed down through her eggs.18  This 
hypothetical—but inevitable—situation involves a child with a genetic 
disease who is born from the egg of a donor who could not 
reasonably have known she carried a predisposition to a genetic 
disease until after the egg donation process.19  In short, the question 
is whether egg donors are subject to a continuing duty to warn. 
 17. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Baines, Note, Gamete Donors and Mistaken Identities:  The 
Importance of Genetic Awareness and Proposals Favoring Donor Identity Disclosure for 
Children Born from Gamete Donations in the United States, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 116, 118–19 
(2007) (asserting the medical and psychological reasons why a child born through 
sperm, egg or embryo donation should have access to his genetic history); Pino 
D’Orazio, Note, Half of the Family Tree:  A Call for Access to a Full Genetic History for 
Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 249, 253 (2006) 
(arguing for children’s access to their sperm donor’s genetic history because of the 
importance of having such information when making health decisions); Amy Shelf, 
Note, A Need To Know Basis:  Record Keeping, Information Access, and the Uniform Status of 
Children of Assisted Conception Act, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1047, 1047–48 (2000) (arguing for 
an offspring-oriented approach, based on the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted 
Conception Act, for regulating access to donors’ genetic information by children 
conceived through ART). 
 18. For a compendious discussion of genetic diseases, transmission and testing, 
see Sonia M. Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway?:  Familial Conflicts over Access 
to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1886–87 (1993) (analyzing the 
competing interests that may arise when a family member is diagnosed with a genetic 
disease, because the other family members may or may not want to be informed, but 
noting that the patient himself should not lose his right to medical confidentiality). 
 19. The hypothetical, prospective problem analyzed in this Comment can be 
expressed in narrative form: 
  In 2001, a twenty year-old girl in apparently perfect health entered into 
an anonymous egg donation contract with a recipient couple who, after 
eight years of marriage, had failed to conceive.  As per the egg donation 
agency’s procedure, the girl was matched with the couple after providing 
multiple photographs of herself and her immediate family, submitting a 
personal statement, completing a psychological profiling test, and compiling 
brief medical histories of herself and her parents, siblings and grandparents.  
The donor and the recipient couple chose never to meet, and the contract’s 
provisions reinforced this choice.  The donor then underwent a 
gynecological exam, and blood tests for sexually transmitted diseases, but no 
tests were conducted to discover latent genetic disorders.  The donor’s 
“donation cycle” and surgery were successful, and nine months later, the wife 
bore a child conceived with one of the donated eggs and her own husband’s 
sperm.  The egg donor was never informed of the successful birth. 
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The answer, developed in detail below, is that it is unlikely liability 
would attach to the egg donor for latent genetic disorders she passed 
down to the egg donation child, either under a product liability or 
negligence theory, though the possibility warrants preemptive 
regulation.  For lack of precedent, conclusions are reached by 
comparison to the analogous legal issues surrounding adoption, 
surrogacy, sperm donation, and blood donation, as well as the social 
trends implied by tangential precedent.  Section I reviews the very 
limited history of litigation in which egg donation was a factor, the 
comparably scarce state and federal regulation of egg donation, and 
the case and statutory law covering analogous legal topics. 
Part II.A explores whether liability could attach under a product 
liability theory.20  Egg donation transactions are generally considered 
renditions of services, not sales of goods,21 but the sizeable 
compensation egg “donors” receive makes this classification 
controversial.22  Even so, the impossibility of guaranteeing genetic 
  In 2009, eight years later, the former egg donor is diagnosed with adult-
onset diabetes (type II diabetes), a condition she was genetically predisposed 
toward developing.  Her children will inherit this predisposition.  The donor 
never notifies the recipient couple because she has no knowledge of or 
relationship with them.  The same is true of the egg donation child, whom 
she does not know even exists.  Fifteen years after this diagnosis, the child, 
born to the recipient couple with the donor’s egg, is now twenty-three and is 
diagnosed with the same disease.  After contacting the egg donation agency 
and fertility clinic that helped bring him to life, the child eventually learns of 
the egg donor’s diabetes.  The child sues his genetic mother, the donor, 
claiming she breached a duty to warn him of the inheritable disease that he 
could otherwise have prevented. 
 20. Cf. Megan D. McIntyre, Comment, The Potential for Products Liability Actions 
when Artificial Insemination by an Anonymous Donor Produces Children with Genetic Defects, 
98 DICK. L. REV. 519, 519 (1993) (analyzing whether sperm donors are liable under a 
product liability theory for genetic defects passed to their genetic offspring through 
their anonymously donated sperm). 
 21. But see Jay A. Soled, The Sale of Donors’ Eggs:  A Case Study of Why Congress Must 
Modify the Capital Asset Definition, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 919 (1999) (arguing that 
human eggs are commodities, so payment to egg donors is for purchase of property 
rather than services rendered, and thus that egg donation transactions fit squarely 
within the definition of “capital asset” under the Internal Revenue Code). 
 22. See infra Part II.A (analyzing whether egg donation could fall under a product 
liability scheme based on the tremendous amounts of money intending parents pay 
donors).  Compare Andrew Wancata, Note, No Value for a Pound of Flesh:  Extending 
Market-Inalienability of the Human Body, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 221 (2003–2004) 
(“[S]perm and ova have become market commodities, reaching bids from 
prospective purchasers as high as $15,000 and $50,000, respectively.”), with Ethics 
Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., ASRM Ethics Committee Report:  Financial 
Compensation of Oocyte Donors, 8 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 305–09 (2007) [hereinafter 
Ethics Comm., Compensation] (describing the variety of compensation schemes, and 
recognizing that the pain, discomfort and time commitment experienced by egg 
donors justify and render ethical any compensation under $5,000, but nothing over 
$10,000). 
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outcomes and the public policy against “baby-selling”23 will likely 
prevent successful application of a product liability theory to a civil 
suit against an egg donor for failing to warn. 
Part II.B examines an egg donor’s potential liability for latent 
genetic disease inherited by the egg donation child under a 
negligence theory.  While genetic “parentage” may well create a 
legally relevant relationship between the donor and the child, both 
the law’s preference for traditional family structures24 and the best 
interests of the child25 suggest the donor should not be held to an 
ongoing duty to warn. 
Part III offers recommendations for regulating egg donation in 
order to prevent suits similar to the one discussed here.  Currently, 
the industry is almost completely unregulated and the level of donor 
screening is frequently low.26  Instead of imposing liability on the egg 
donors, this Comment argues the burden of care should rest on the 
fertility clinic doctors and the egg donation agencies to properly 
screen egg donors. 
 23. See infra Part II.A (defining “baby-selling” as the feared commodification of 
children).  This prohibition on selling babies is a broad bar on profiting from the 
legal transfer of children, encompassing adoption, surrogacy and other activities.  
See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (explaining that traditional 
surrogacy agreements violate the public policy against selling children because 
payment is exchanged for ownership of the child).  Kentucky’s statute is illustrative: 
A person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall not be a party to a 
contract or agreement which would compensate a woman for her artificial 
insemination and subsequent termination of parental rights to a child born 
as a result of that artificial insemination. . . . Contracts or agreements 
entered into in violation of this subsection shall be void. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (West 2007). 
 24. See generally Dolgin, supra note 3, at 527–42 (arguing that case law reveals the 
law’s general preference for maintaining traditional family structures, even if doing 
so requires subjugation of traditional biological—birth—notions of motherhood). 
 25. This standard is used in adoption proceedings and surrogacy custody suits.  
See, e.g., Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246–48 (invalidating a surrogacy contract because a 
child’s best interests are not served by prenatal determination of custody). 
 26. Although egg donors are generally tested for communicable and sexually 
transmitted diseases through blood tests and ultrasound examinations, genetic 
testing to uncover latent diseases is rare.  See ADVISORY GROUP ON ASSISTED REPROD. 
TECHS., N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & LAW, THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG 
DONOR?  GET THE FACTS BEFORE YOU DECIDE! 8–9 (2002), available at 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/community/reproductive_health/infertility/docs/11
27.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY GROUP, GET THE FACTS] (explaining the industry 
standards for egg donor screening in New York State, indicating that most tests are 
discretionary, and noting that egg donation agencies rely a great deal on the 
prospective donor’s answers to general family medical history questions).  These 
basic tests are the minimum required by the Food and Drug Administration.   
21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.75, 1271.80 (2007). 
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I. BACKGROUND:  EGG DONATION AT LAW AND RELATED LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
A. A Brief History of Egg Donation 
The first successful in vitro fertilization (“IVF”)27 procedure was 
completed in 1978.28  Almost thirty years later, in 2006, the world’s 
three millionth IVF child was born.29  Egg donation is the substitution 
of a different woman’s eggs to be fertilized and implanted in the 
intending mother, and is thus an outgrowth of IVF.30  Based on data 
from the eighty-nine percent of registered American fertility clinics 
that reported their 2004 data, one percent of all children born in the 
United States in 2004 were conceived through ART, totaling 49,458 
ART children born,31 of which 6,653 were conceived with donated 
eggs.32
More recent statistics are not yet compiled, but with one in seven 
U.S. women predicted to experience infertility,33 the number of 
children conceived through egg donation is likely to continue 
growing at startling rates.  As our society struggles to keep pace with 
reproductive technology, our courts will increasingly be called upon 
to resolve emerging disputes. 
B. Egg Donation in the Courts 
Egg donation, despite its increasing prevalence, has rarely featured 
in court except in a few custody disputes arising out of breaches of 
gestational surrogacy contracts.  Seminally, in 1993, the California 
Supreme Court wrestled with alternative reproduction in Johnson v. 
Calvert,34 in which it confronted the question of whether a genetic 
 27. See supra notes 1–2 (describing the role of IVF in ART). 
 28. MUNDY, supra note 5, at 7. 
 29. Press Release, Eur. Soc’y of Human Reprod. & Embryology, Three Million 
Babies Born Using Assisted Reproductive Technologies (2006) (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 30. See supra note 2 (describing the egg donation process in detail). 
 31. Victoria Clay Wright, Jeani Change, Gary Jeng, Michael Chen & Maurizio 
Macaluso, Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance—United States, 2004, MORBIDITY 
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP., June 8, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/ss5606a1.htm. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 1996 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 1 
(1998) [hereinafter CDC, SUCCESS RATES] (finding that fifteen percent of U.S. 
women of childbearing age had received infertility treatment as of 1996). But see 
MUNDY, supra note 5, at 12 (“About 12 percent of women—7.3 million in 2002—find 
themselves unable to conceive or bring to term children they want.”). 
 34. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
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relationship trumps a biological one.35  The court was asked whether 
a gestational surrogate is the “natural mother” of a child conceived 
with the egg and sperm of the intending parents, a situation in which 
the child is genetically unrelated to its birth mother.36  Shortly before 
the birth, the gestational surrogate threatened to keep the child if 
she was not paid the remaining balance owed to her on the surrogacy 
contract.37  Both sides then filed suits seeking recognition of their 
lawful parentage over the unborn child.38
Finding for the intending parents, the court refused to hold the 
child had two mothers,39 though both women had a cognizable claim 
to motherhood.40  It also denied that the Uniform Parentage Act 
(“UPA”) of 1973,41 enacted to replace the traditional notion of 
illegitimacy with a legal definition of “parent” based on the parent-
child relationship, was not intended to govern surrogacy disputes.42  
So, looking to the parental relationships at play, the court held that 
when consanguinity and giving birth “do not coincide in one woman, 
she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended 
to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her 
own—is the natural mother.”43
In a footnote, the Johnson court applied its holding to egg donation 
situations, concluding that “in a true ‘egg donation’ situation, where 
a woman gestates and gives birth to a child formed from the egg of 
 35. Id. (“Anna [the gestational surrogate], of course, predicates her claim of 
maternity on the fact that she gave birth to the child.  The Calverts [the intending 
parents] contend that Crispina’s genetic relationship to the child establishes that she 
is his mother.”).  A biological relationship is established by birth, whereas genes 
establish a genetic relationship.  See id. at 778 (explaining that while Anna bore the 
child, blood tests excluded her as the genetic mother). 
 36. Id. at 777–78. 
 37. Id. at 778. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 781 n.8 (noting that the gestational surrogate had little contact with the 
family, and declining to recognize parental rights for the “third party” gestational 
surrogate because to recognize such parental rights “would diminish Crispina 
[Calvert]’s role as a mother”). 
 40. Id. at 781–82 (interpreting the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 to recognize 
both birth and blood relationships as proof of motherhood, and reasoning that 
“[b]ecause two women each have presented acceptable proof of maternity, we do not 
believe this case can be decided without enquiring into the parties’ intentions as 
manifested in the surrogacy agreement”). 
 41 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1–30 (1973) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 386–505 
(2001). 
 42. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
 43. Id. at 782.  But see Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially A Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 429, 429 (2007) (arguing that defining motherhood by contract or 
genetics denigrates gestation, and that a gestation-oriented approach to determining 
maternity would produce better results and be more in line with constitutional 
precedent). 
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another woman with the intent to raise the child as her own, the birth 
mother is the natural mother under California law.”44
Directly ruling on parentage in an egg donation case in McDonald 
v. McDonald,45 a New York appellate court reached the conclusion 
proposed by the Johnson footnote.46  There, a father sought sole 
custody of IVF twins conceived with his sperm and anonymously 
donated eggs, and birthed by his soon-to-be ex-wife.47  He argued that 
he was the only parent with a genetic relationship to the children.48  
The court struggled to decide whether the wife, who was both the 
intending and biological mother but who had no genetic relationship 
to the children, could be a mother under New York law.49  Relying on 
the reasoning in Johnson, the court found the wife to be the lawful 
mother.50
More recently, both the California and United States Supreme 
Courts denied certiorari in In re Marriage of Buzzanca,51 in which the 
child was the product of both anonymous sperm and egg donors, and 
was implanted as an IVF embryo into a third-party gestational 
surrogate pursuant to the contract between the surrogate and the 
intending parents.52  The intending parents’ marriage dissolved while 
the surrogate was pregnant, and the husband sought to evade child 
 44. 851 P.2d at 782 n.10.  For an example of an non-“true ‘egg donation’ 
situation,” see K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005), which held: 
A woman who supplies ova to be used to impregnate her lesbian partner, 
with the understanding that the resulting child will be raised in their joint 
home, cannot waive her responsibility to support that child.  Nor can such a 
purported waiver effectively cause that woman to relinquish her parental 
rights. 
Id. at 682. 
For a critique of that holding, see Heather A. Crews, Recent Development, Women 
Be Warned, Egg Donation Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up To Be:  The Copulation of Science and the 
Courts Makes Multiple Mommies, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 141 (2005).  Crews argues the 
distinction between an egg donor and a “provider” of eggs is 
arbitrary and weakens the protections given to egg donors and recipients 
through legislation . . . . [It] allows not only the opportunity for future 
donors to assert parental rights over children created with their eggs, but 
also allows individuals who conceive with donated eggs to impart maternal 
responsibilities to the donor above and beyond those agreed on at the time 
of conception. 
Id. at 154. 
 45. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
 46. Id. at 480 (“[W]e have a true ‘egg donation’ situation, and we find the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court of California on this issue to be persuasive.”). 
 47. Id. at 478–79. 
 48. Id. at 479. 
 49. Id. at 478. 
 50. Id. at 478, 480. 
 51. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998), review denied, No. S069696, 1998 Cal. 
LEXIS 3830 (Cal. June 10, 1998), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 902 (1980). 
 52. Id. at 282. 
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support payments by arguing that he was not the father.53  The trial 
court concluded that the baby had no lawful parents because no 
party was sufficiently related to it.54  The appellate court found that 
conclusion “extraordinary.”55  In reversing, it held that the child 
would never have been conceived but for the intent of the intending 
parents, who were thus the lawful parents, despite their lack of either 
a genetic or biological relationship to the child.56
Similar cases have been litigated,57 as have medical malpractice 
suits against fertility doctors and clinics,58 but an egg donor’s liability 
for failing to warn of subsequently discovered genetic disease has yet 
to be heard in court. 
C. Regulation of Egg Donation 
The legal parameters of assisted reproduction present a vast and 
unexplored frontier into which only the model Uniform Parentage 
Act, discussed below, has ventured.59  Egg donation is generally 
unregulated,60 and the liability of egg donors themselves is completely 
unregulated.61  There is no relevant federal regulation,62 and the few 
 53. Id. at 282–83. 
 54. Id. at 282. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally Campbell, supra note 1 (discussing cases in which determinations 
of parentage are complicated by assisted reproductive technology, and specifically 
surrogacy). 
 58. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted 
Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 (2004) (discussing the possible physical harm 
caused to children conceived and born through ART, due to increased likelihood of 
twins and other multiples, potential transmission of diseases from donors, and 
complications from low birth weight); Fred Norton, Note, Assisted Reproduction and the 
Frustration of Genetic Affinity:  Interest, Injury, and Damages, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 795 
(1999) (describing the psychological injury caused when gametes are negligently 
used to fertilize or impregnate the wrong eggs or woman or are stolen and 
fraudulently used for that purpose). 
 59. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1–30 (1973) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 386–505 
(2001). 
 60. See Alexander N. Hecht, Comment and Note, The Wild Wild West:  Inadequate 
Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 227–29 
(2001) (exploring the lack of regulation of the fertility industry, underlying reasons 
for that dearth, and the need for legislation to address the issue). 
 61. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 4 n.4 (C.P. Eerie County 2004) 
(noting that most state legislatures have not addressed egg donation because it is a 
relatively new procedure). 
 62. See Laura M. Katers, Comment, Arguing the “Obvious” in Wisconsin:  Why State 
Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology Has Not Come To Pass, and How It Should, 
2000 WIS. L. REV. 441, 443–44 (describing the general lack of comprehensive 
regulation, including at the federal level, of ART).  The only federal regulation 
directly affecting the egg donation industry is the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and 
Certification Act of 1992, but it only requires medical clinics engaged in the business 
of ART to annually report their success rates per each type of ART procedure to the 
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states with statutes even mentioning egg donation—California, 
Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, and New York—only regulate artificial 
insemination, sperm donation, or surrogacy agreements.63
Adopted in pertinent part in eighteen states, the model Uniform 
Parentage Act of 1973, promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”), proposed a 
modern approach to legitimacy and paternity based upon parent-
child relationships instead of the marital status of the parents.64  The 
1973 UPA suggested evidentiary standards for determining paternity, 
but it did not address issues arising from egg donation.65
Centers for Disease Control.  Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7 (1992). 
The United States does prohibit payment for human organs under the National 
Organ Transplant Act, which levies sanctions upon any person who knowingly 
acquires, receives or transfers a human organ for payment.  42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274(e) 
(2006).  However, “organ” is narrowly defined and does not include gametes, so the 
prohibition on buying and selling human organs does not apply to human eggs.  See, 
e.g., Margaret R. Sobota, Note, The Price of Life:  $50,000 for an Egg, Why Not $1,500 for 
a Kidney?  An Argument To Establish a Market for Organ Procurement Similar to the Current 
Market for Human Egg Procurement, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1225, 1243 n.135 (2004) 
(discussing the disparate legal treatment of egg donation compared to organ 
donation and advocating for a free market approach to regulating organ donation 
because of the likelihood of increased social and economic efficiency and utility). 
 63. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. § 63.213 (2003); 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 47/1 (2003); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–124 (McKinney 2008). 
Louisiana is the only state in America that directly regulates egg donation, rather 
than the parentage of children resulting from ART procedures.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:122 (2000).  The Louisiana statute flatly prohibits “[t]he sale of a human ovum, 
fertilized human ovum, or human embryo.”  Id.  The underlying policy is recognition 
of embryos as people and the establishment of appropriate guidelines for their 
handling and storage.  See John Bologna Krentel, The Louisiana “Human Embryo” 
Statute Revisited:  Reasonable Recognition and Protection for the In Vitro Fertilized Ovum,  
45 LOY. L. REV. 239, 241 (1999) (arguing that the Louisiana statute is 
groundbreaking and should be followed by other states because of its recognition of 
the human life in embryos).  No prosecutions under the statute have been filed.  
Sobota, supra note 62, at 1243. 
 64. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (1973) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 390 (2001) 
(“The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every 
parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.”).  Alabama, California, 
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and 
Wyoming have each adopted the 1973 UPA in pertinent part.  9B Uniform Laws 
Annotated 377 tbl. (master ed., West Publ’g Co. 2001) (1968); see also Kira 
Horstmeyer, Note, Putting Your Eggs in Someone Else’s Basket:  Inserting Uniformity into 
the Uniform Parentage Act’s Treatment of Assisted Reproduction, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
671, 684–91 (2007) (categorizing the five types of state statutes governing sperm and 
egg donation, and including Kansas, Missouri, Connecticut, and Idaho as states that 
follow the 1973 UPA, at least in effect). 
 65. See, e.g., Horstmeyer, supra note 64, at 685 (noting that the UPA of 1973 
“fail[s] to address the problem of egg donation, likely because [it was] enacted at a 
time when the technology for most egg donation assisted reproductive procedures 
was not then feasible”). 
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Recognizing the inadequacies of the 1973 UPA, the NCCUSL 
revised it in 2002 to include provisions covering egg and sperm 
donation situations.66  The new, gender-neutral UPA provides: 
 If a child is conceived as the result of assisted reproduction, this 
section clarifies that a donor (whether of sperm or egg) is not a 
parent of the resulting child.  The donor can neither sue to 
establish parental rights, nor be sued and required to support the 
resulting child.  In sum, donors are eliminated from the parental 
equation.67
In its own words, “the new [model] Act makes a policy decision to 
clearly exclude the egg donor from claiming maternity.”68
However, though it is significantly better suited to govern the 
intricacies of modern reproduction, even the revised UPA has little 
practical use in litigation in which egg donation is a factor.  Only four 
states have adopted the revision,69 and it lacks a provision discussing 
the liability of donors who transmit diseases, viral or genetic, either 
through fraud or negligence, or because they are uninformed.  As 
such, the UPA leaves unanswered the question of an egg donor’s 
liability toward her genetic offspring. 
D. Related Developments at Law 
As so little concerning egg donation has been determined, which 
direction the law will take as it struggles with these myriad new legal 
issues can only be analyzed by analogy to tangential and related 
issues.  The most useful of these relevant fields are surrogacy, 
adoption, and sperm and blood donation.  The law’s handling of 
each, in turn, may foreshadow comparable treatment of cases 
involving egg donors’ liability concerning the genetic make-up of 
their eggs. 
 66. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT arts. 7–8 (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355–70 
(2001 & Supp. 2008), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/ 
final2002.pdf (reproducing the full text of the updated 2002 UPA, including 
commentary by the issuing NCCUSL). 
 67. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 
(2001).  The UPA explicitly states:  “A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by 
means of assisted reproduction.”  Id. § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355.   
 68. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 cmt. (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 51 
(Supp. 2008). 
 69. See Meghan Anderson, Comment and Casenote, K.M v. E.G.:  Blurring the 
Lines of Parentage in the Modern Courts, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 275, 279 n.41 (noting that 
only Delaware, Texas, Washington and Wyoming have adopted the revised version).  
Cf. Horstmeyer, supra note 64, at 687 (comparing the 2002 UPA with a Colorado 
statute). 
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1. Surrogacy:  Regulation and case law 
Surrogacy necessarily involves multiple “mothers,” so it is useful for 
comparison with egg donation, which also muddles legal parentage.70  
Surrogacy is the most regulated ART, in part because of the fallout 
from In re Baby M,71 an infamous 1988 custody dispute arising from a 
traditional surrogacy agreement (the surrogate was artificially 
inseminated by the intending husband’s sperm).72  For $10,000, the 
surrogate was to surrender the child at his birth to the intending 
parents, but she refused to relinquish the baby.73  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court, considering the child’s best interests, granted 
custody to the intending parents, but invalidated the surrogacy 
contract as a violation of the public policy prohibition against baby-
selling, codified in all adoption statutes.74  In accord, some states still 
consider paid surrogacy agreements to be criminal.75  Other states 
require that surrogacy contracts, though lawful, be careful not to 
cross the line into baby-selling.76
In Stiver v. Parker,77 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held that the relationship between a surrogacy broker (which 
is akin to an egg donation agency) and the surrogate is sufficiently 
“special” to create an affirmative duty to protect the children born 
through the process.78  Accidentally, the surrogacy agency’s doctors 
impregnated the surrogate with her own husband’s sperm instead of 
the intending father’s, and the child was born with hereditary 
cytomegalic inclusion disease.79  The surrogate sued the agency for 
 70. However, for analysis of an egg donor’s liability for failing to warn her 
genetic offspring, surrogacy is only marginally useful because gestational surrogates 
have no genetic relationship to children they birth, so there is no possibility of 
genetic disease transferring to offspring. 
 71. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 72. See, e.g., Katers, supra note 62, at 454–59 (discussing Wisconsin’s legislative 
reaction to In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)). 
 73. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1227, 1235–37. 
 74. Id. at 1240.  See generally Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making:  In 
the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 67–70 (analyzing the market 
mechanisms that brought the infertile intending parents and the surrogate 
together). 
 75. E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 122–123 (McKinney 2008) (“Surrogate parenting 
contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void 
and unenforceable.”). 
 76. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.213 (2003) (“A preplanned adoption agreement shall not 
contain any provision . . . [t]o reduce any amount paid to the volunteer mother if the 
child is stillborn or is born alive but impaired, or to provide for the payment of a 
supplement or bonus for any reason.”).  
 77. 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that a special relationship giving rise to 
a fiduciary duty of care exists between a surrogacy broker and the intending mother, 
husband and intended child). 
 78. Id. at 272. 
 79. Id. at 263. 
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negligence, and the Sixth Circuit held the agency did owe the 
surrogate a duty of care because of the special relationship the 
surrogacy process created between the parties.80  The factors giving 
rise to an affirmative duty of care included the agency’s commercial 
profit, its doctors and lawyers’ professional status and control of 
contract terms, and the fact that the other parties entrusted 
themselves into the surrogacy agency’s care.81
2. Adoption:  Regulation and case law 
Adoption is useful for comparison with egg donation because an 
adopted child, or adoptee, is genetically related to the “donating” 
parent, but the intending parent assumes all legal and parental rights 
and duties.82  Unlike egg donation, adoption is fully regulated by 
statutes that generally prioritize the best interests of the child by 
clearly establishing the adopter as the legal parent in order to create 
the stability and security of a normal parent-child relationship.83
Notwithstanding the severance of all legal relationship between an 
adoptee and his birth parents, many states recognize an adoptee’s 
need for access to his adoption records in certain situations, provided 
the birth parent’s privacy is protected.84  Different mechanisms exist 
for balancing these two conflicting interests, including mutual 
consent registries, confidential intermediary systems, and open 
 80. Id. at 272. 
 81. Id. at 271–72. 
 82. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15 (LexisNexis 2007) (mandating the 
complete termination of all legal relationships between the adoptee’s biological 
parents and the intending, adopting parents). 
 83. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 14, at 711–16 (discussing two requirements for 
adoption:  parents seeking to adopt must be fit and the adoptee is entitled to stability 
through clear legal parentage determinations); see also Michelle L. Anderson, 
Comment, Are You My Mommy?:  A Call for Regulation of Embryo Donation, 35 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 589, 610–11 (2006) (describing the concern for the adoptee’s “[r]ight to a 
[c]lear [d]etermination of [p]arental [r]ights and [r]esponsibilities” manifested in 
adoption statutes through the severance of all legal relationship between the adoptee 
and his biological parents, and arguing that such a clear determination is necessary 
in assisted reproduction situations). 
For example, the Georgia adoption statute provides: 
[A]doption terminates all legal relationships between the adopted individual 
and his relatives, including his parent, so that the adopted individual 
thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes . . . [and] 
creates the relationship of parent and child between each petitioner and the 
adopted individual, as if the adopted individual were a child of biological 
issue of that petitioner. The adopted individual shall enjoy every right and 
privilege of a biological child of that petitioner; shall be deemed a biological 
child of that petitioner . . . . 
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19(a)(1)–(2) (2007). 
 84. See Richards & Wolf, supra note 8, at 424 n.70 (listing various examples of 
state statutes permitting and restricting adoptees’ access to the medical information 
of their biological parents). 
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records.85  However, only four states allow an adoptee, upon reaching 
majority, to access his adoption records upon request without a 
judicial hearing.86  More commonly, an adoptee must show good 
cause to be granted such access.87  For example, a Missouri appellate 
court refused to open the adoption records for an adult plaintiff 
suffering from leukemia who sought a match for a bone marrow 
transplant.88  Despite the urgency of his need, the court denied him 
access to his biological father’s identity and medical information 
because the improbability of finding a viable match outweighed any 
benefit to be gained from disclosure.89
The liability of adoption agencies, which serve an equivalent 
function to egg donation agencies, has been considered, and many 
statutes and courts indemnify them except in instances of gross 
negligence or fraudulent misrepresentation.90  In keeping with this 
policy, in Olson v. Children’s Home Society of California,91 biological 
parents who had given up their first son for adoption unsuccessfully 
sued the adoption agency for negligence after their second son died 
 85. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 8, at 162–68 (describing the various 
approaches used by states to open adoption records and the medical information of 
biological parents for adoptees). 
 86. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.502 (2005); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (2007); see also Cahn & Singer, supra note 8, at 167 (Alaska and 
Kansas). 
 87. See Richards & Wolf, supra note 8, at 424 n.70 (listing various examples of 
state statutes permitting and restricting adoptees’ access to the medical information 
of their biological parents, including provisions requiring necessity or show of good 
cause). 
 88. In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
 89. Id. at 621–23 (balancing “the factual need and the policy against disclosure”); 
see also Sandra L.G. v. Bouchey, 576 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991) 
(refraining from reaching past legislative guidelines to open adoption records 
because “it is of great concern . . . that any exercise of discretion beyond that 
mandated by the Legislature will be governed by clear, consistent and effective 
principles.  They must be clear and consistent so that attorneys and others involved 
in the adoption process can well explain the rules governing confidentiality to the 
parents and subsequently to the children over the course of a lifetime, if necessary.  
They must be effective so that any disclosure will pose only a demonstrable physical 
benefit to the person seeking access as opposed to gratuitous obtaining of 
emotionally charged information”). 
 90. Compare Burr v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986) 
(allowing recovery by adopting parents when the adoption agency fraudulently 
misrepresented the adoptee’s health), with MacMath v. Me. Adoption Placement 
Servs., 635 A.2d 359 (Me. 1993) (refusing to hold adoption agencies to be guarantors 
of the adoptee’s health absent a fiduciary duty to disclose information to the 
intending parents), and Ann Marie N. v. City of S.F., 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
2463, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding for the adoption agency against the 
adopting mother of an HIV positive baby because, in California, adoption agencies 
are not liable for mere negligence in providing health information about prospective 
adoptees). 
 91. 252 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Ct. App. 1988). 
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of a genetic disease.92  The parents claimed the agency was 
responsible for the death because it had not informed them their first 
son died of the same disease after being adopted, and, had they 
known, they could have timely treated the second son or not 
conceived again.93  In rejecting the parents’ argument, the court 
found no special relationship between the agency and the biological 
parents that would create an ongoing duty to warn.94
3. Sperm Donation:  Regulation and case law 
Given simple but fundamental similarities between sperm and egg 
donation, the former offers a very comparable template for analyzing 
egg donation.95  The sperm donation-artificial insemination process is 
the creation of a child using the gamete of a paid anonymous donor 
who is chosen on the basis of his photo and a description of his 
general interests and health, and with little regulatory oversight.96
A sperm donor generally has no relationship at all with children 
conceived artificially with his sperm,97 and in some states he is barred 
by statute from asserting any parental rights.98  However, though still a 
small minority trend, the status of sperm donors is becoming 
 92. Id. at 11. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 13. 
 95. The most important difference between egg donation and sperm donation is 
the very invasive procedures involved in the former compared to the minute time 
and effort demands of the latter.  This is an important difference when determining 
the liability of the sperm donor compared to the egg donor, because a sperm donor 
does not develop a doctor-patient relationship with fertility doctors or donation 
agencies and is thus not entitled to medical confidentiality. See infra Part II.B. 
 96. See, e.g., Katers, supra note 62, at 452–54 (discussing the limit of Wisconsin’s 
regulation of artificial insemination and possible reasons why no further legislation 
has been enacted). 
 97. But cf. In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (reversing the lower court’s 
decision against the biological father of a child conceived through sperm donation 
who sought parental rights over the child, because the father and mother knew each 
other and might have agreed not to extinguish the sperm donor’s parental rights, 
and therefore the donor might be the lawful father of the child, despite Colorado’s 
artificial insemination statute). 
 98. A typical example of state regulation of sperm donation is New Jersey’s 
adoption of the UPA: 
Unless the donor of semen and the woman have entered into a written 
contract to the contrary, the donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the 
donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the father of a child thereby 
conceived and shall have no rights or duties stemming from the 
conception . . . . 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 2007); see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (Deering 
2007) (adopting the UPA’s presumption of paternity in favor of the husband when 
the wife is inseminated with a third party’s donated sperm, if the insemination is 
conducted with the husband’s consent and through a licensed physician). 
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murkier, both socially99 and legally, as a few recent cases have 
imposed child support payments on sperm donors who were known 
to the women artificially inseminated with their sperm.100
Relevant for analysis of the hypothetical egg donation case at issue 
in this Comment, there has been limited litigation over liability for 
transmission of genetic disorders to children conceived with donated 
sperm.101  In Johnson v. California Cryobank, Inc.,102 an appellate court 
adjudicated a negligence and fraud suit against a sperm bank that 
misrepresented to recipient parents the known medical history of a 
sperm donor who had an extensive family history of genetic kidney 
disease.103  The resulting child had acute kidney disease that her 
mother could not have transmitted to her.104  The suit became a battle 
over donor anonymity105 when the parents tried to obtain proof of the 
 99. Socially, mechanisms are developing to allow children conceived with 
donated sperm (or eggs) to connect with their genetic siblings or parents.  Cf. Amy 
Harmon, Sperm Donor Father Ends His Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at A18 
(describing one former sperm donor’s decision to find and meet his genetic 
offspring, through the Donor Sibling Registry, after reading a newspaper article 
about the children’s search for each other).  Founded in 2001, The Donor Sibling 
Registry “assist[s] individuals conceived as a result of sperm, egg or embryo donation 
that are seeking to make mutually desired contact with others with whom they share 
genetic ties.”  The Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/ 
about.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).  The site describes its mission as facilitating 
connections in “unchartered territory.”  The Donor Sibling Registry, Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/FaqPage.php (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2008). 
 100. See, e.g., Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding 
a former lover of the mother who agreed to donate sperm to her to be the lawful 
father, and thus responsible for child support, even though the mother had 
promised he would have no parental duties or responsibilities and lied about being 
married, because the best interests of the children make such a promise 
unenforceable), vacated, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).  See generally Karen De Haan, 
Note, Whose Child Am I?:  A Look at How Consent Affects a Husband’s Obligation To 
Support a Child Conceived Through Heterologous Artificial Insemination, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 
809, 809 (1998) (discussing the regulation of husbands’ duties owed to the children 
of their wives who are conceived through artificial insemination using a third party’s 
sperm, and are thus genetically and biologically unrelated to the husband); Jason 
Miller, Sperm Donor Indispensable Party To Support Proceedings, 9 LAW J. 2, 2 (2007) 
(discussing Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), which found that 
a sperm donor was indispensable to a proceeding to determine the custody of 
children born to a lesbian couple who conceived through artificial insemination with 
his sperm). 
 101. E.g., Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(ordering disclosure by a sperm bank of a sperm donor’s medical records, but 
keeping his identity protected, in a suit by the parents of a child conceived with the 
sperm of the anonymous donor who had a family history of kidney disease that was 
not disclosed by the sperm bank). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 867. 
 104. Id. at 868. 
 105. The issue of donor anonymity, with respect to egg donation contracts that 
sever all legal and social ties between the donor and any resulting children, is 
discussed infra Part II.B. 
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sperm bank’s fraudulent misrepresentation.106  The court found the 
doctor-patient privilege inapplicable to the sperm donor’s situation 
because, as the donor’s only contact with the sperm bank was to sell 
his sperm, he was not a “patient.”107  The court further found the 
absolute anonymity agreement signed by all parties to be 
unenforceable as a matter of public policy because sperm donation 
children might need access to their medical history in order to treat 
medical conditions.108
4. Blood Donation:  Regulation and case law 
Comparable to genetic disease passed through donated eggs, blood 
donors can carry viruses that are transmitted to patients through 
blood transfusions.109  Since the outbreak of AIDS,110 this risk has 
received considerable attention.111
Blood is an exception to a prohibition on the sale of human organs 
and tissue.112  The underlying policy is protection of the great 
national need for blood for medical use.113  To protect blood supply, 
most states have “blood shield statutes,” enacted in response to suits 
brought by patients infected with contaminated blood, that classify 
 106. Cryobank, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869–70. 
 107. Id. at 872. 
 108. Id. at 875. 
 109. See, e.g., McKee v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding 
summary judgment for the defendant blood product manufacturer whose product 
infected the plaintiff with AIDS, because Kentucky’s blood shield statute barred strict 
liability claims, and proof of compliance with industry standards of care was sufficient 
evidence of non-negligence). 
 110. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) causes AIDS (the Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome).  See Kevin Hopkins, Blood, Sweat, and Tears:  Toward a 
New Paradigm for Protecting Donor Privacy, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 141, 142–50 (2000) 
(discussing the competing interests of blood donor privacy, recovery by blood 
recipients for infections caused by contaminated blood, and society’s interest in 
maintaining an adequate blood supply, and arguing in favor of protecting the privacy 
interest of blood donors now that adequate screening technology is available). 
 111. See id. (noting the fact that few AIDS-related cases result from blood 
transfusions, but discussing reasons why this risk remains a legitimate concern). 
 112. For example, Georgia’s statute makes it unlawful for any person or entity “to 
buy or sell, to offer to buy or sell, or to assist . . . buying or selling . . . a human body 
or any part of a human body or . . . a human fetus or any part thereof.”  GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-12-160(a) (2007).  However, “[t]he purchase or sale of whole blood, blood 
plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, other self-replicating body fluids, or hair” 
is exempted.  Id. § 16-12-160(b)(1). 
 113. National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,702 (Sept. 10, 1974); see, e.g., Murphy 
v. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 252 (Cal. 1985) (contrasting the public policy 
of maintaining an adequate national blood supply, which underlies California’s 
prohibition on classification of a sale or transfer of blood as a sale of goods in order 
to prevent strict liability suits if that blood is contaminated, with the sale of a 
pharmaceutical product). 
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blood donation as a service, not a sale of a good.114  This insulates 
blood donors, hospitals and blood banks from strict liability and 
invocation of the Uniform Commercial Code’s (“UCC”) warranties 
that attach to sales of goods.115  Thus, these statutes restrict the 
liability of donors, banks and hospitals to negligence or fraud.116  
Many of the blood shield statutes are not limited in scope to blood, 
but include all human tissue in their wording, even if that tissue is 
paid for; a typical statute does not mention human eggs, but refers to 
human “tissue,” which arguably includes gametes.117
In suits against blood donors themselves for negligence, the 
donor’s privacy and medical confidentiality interests are weighed 
against the public policy of maintaining an adequate blood supply.118  
Generally, the public interest is deemed to outweigh an individual 
donor’s privacy interest.119  In many states, statutes authorize 
disclosure of a blood donor’s identity for good cause.120  Separate 
 114. See Kathryn W. Pieplow, Comment, AIDS, Blood Banks, and the Courts:  The 
Legal Response to Transfusion-Acquired Disease, 38 S.D. L. REV. 609, 622–24 (1993) 
(detailing the blood shield statutes enacted in response to negligence and strict 
liability suits brought by patients infected with AIDS through blood transfusions); see 
also Murphy, 710 P.2d at 252 (noting that the purpose of blood shield statutes is to 
“avoid application of the doctrine of strict liability” to individuals involved in the 
production, use, or sale of blood plasma, “thereby promoting the constant availability 
of an adequate supply of blood”).  “In keeping with this purpose, it is held that a 
hospital using blood in a transfusion, a blood bank supplying the blood and a 
manufacturer of blood plasma selling it for transfusion are immune from strict 
liability because the Legislature has declared . . . that they are providing a service 
rather than making a sale.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 115. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 20, at 529. (explaining that under strict liability 
precautions taken by the seller would be irrelevant, as the sole determinant of 
liability would be the quality of the blood). 
 116. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2 (1993). (declaring that distributing 
blood in IL is a service and precluding the application of strict tort liability). 
 117. Illinois’s blood shield statute is typical and broadly worded: 
[U]sing human whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives and 
products, corneas, bones, or organs or other human tissue for the purpose 
of injecting, transfusing or transplanting any of them in the human body is 
declared for purposes of liability in tort or contract to be the rendition of a 
service by every person, firm or corporation participating therein, whether 
or not any remuneration is paid therefor, and is declared not to be a sale of 
any such items and no warranties of any kind . . . nor strict tort liability shall 
be applicable thereto . . . . 
Id. 
 118. E.g., Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 374 (Wash. 1991) 
(applying a balancing test that requires the court to “identify and weigh the 
comparative and compelling public and private interests of plaintiff, defendant and 
the donor”).  See generally Hopkins, supra note 110, at 153 (promoting donors’ privacy 
interest now that adequate screening technology exists). 
 119. Hopkins, supra note 110, at 156–57. 
 120. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9 (West 2007) (“The record of a person who has 
or is suspected of having AIDS or HIV infection may be disclosed by an order of a 
court of competent jurisdiction which is granted pursuant to an application showing 
good cause therefor.”). 
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actions against donors themselves are allowed in instances of 
misrepresentation, fraud or negligence.121  As the Sixth Circuit 
explains: 
 The donor’s privacy interests are substantial, as is the public 
interest in maintaining a safe and adequate blood supply.  
However . . . [the plaintiffs’] right to litigate their claims against 
the donor substantially outweighs the competing interests, 
especially . . . [if] there is significant evidence to suggest that the 
donor’s conduct was suspect.122
This balancing of interests foreshadows the probable balancing of 
the similar interests in play in egg donation situations. 
II. ANALYSIS:  IS AN EGG DONOR LIABLE FOR HER GENETIC DEFECTS? 
The two legal theories under which an egg donor might be held 
liable for transmitting latent genetic disorders to an egg donation 
child, and both fall within the purview of tort law:  product liability 
and negligence.  In Part II, they are discussed in turn, and this 
Comment concludes that while courts could potentially impose 
liability under either, the inability to know of genetic predispositions, 
the public policy implications of recognizing an egg donor as a 
genetic parent, and the best interests of an egg donation child all 
support not holding the egg donor liable. 
A. Human Eggs as Commodities 
If human eggs are considered products, egg donors’ future liability 
as producers and sellers of these “marketable goods” may potentially 
permit actions in tort for failure to warn of “product” defects, namely, 
a disease carried in their genes.123  Whether human eggs are 
marketable goods has not been determined in America,124 but such a 
 121. See, e.g., Coleman v. Am. Red Cross, 1994 Fed. App. 0156P (6th Cir.), 23 F.3d 
1091 (allowing discovery of a donor’s identity and medical information when the 
plaintiff is pursuing a separate claim against the blood donor when the blood donor 
intentionally misrepresented his risk status prior to repeatedly donating). 
 122. Id. at 1096. 
 123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:  NEGLIGENCE § 402A (1965). 
 124. See, e.g., Ethics Comm., Compensation, supra note 22, at 306 (noting that, 
although some believe that “payment for oocytes implies that they are property or 
commodities, and thus devalues human life[,] . . . [c]ompensation based on a 
reasonable assessment of the time, inconvenience, and discomfort associated with 
oocyte retrieval can and should be distinguished from payment for the oocytes 
themselves”). 
By comparison, several western countries, including England and Italy, have 
banned all payment for human eggs to avoid the ethical quagmires created by 
“selling” body parts or babies.  See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 
37, § 12 (Eng.) (prohibiting payment to egg donors other than compensation for 
actual expenses); see also Law 40/2004 of Feb. 19, 2004, 2004 Gazz. Uff. No. 45, Feb. 
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determination will have broad implications in a case in which a 
genetic disease is passed from an egg donor, unknowingly but 
without negligence, to an egg donation child.  Thus, the threshold 
question in an analysis of the liability of an egg donor is whether eggs 
are commodities.125  While treatment of human eggs as marketable 
goods—such that egg donors, as vendors, could be held to be 
guarantors of their genes—is unlikely because of the public policy 
implications, the tremendous payments donors receive from 
intending parents leave the possibility open.  Classification of eggs as 
products would allow an egg donation recipient to bring an action 
against the donor under a product liability theory, discussed in Part 
II.A.1.  It is also conceivable that a recipient parent might argue a 
breach of implied warranties under the UCC, analyzed in Part II.A.3. 
A small-sample American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
(“ASRM”) survey of egg donation found that the average 
compensation given to donors is $5,204, though payment can be 
considerably higher.126  In fact, egg donation received its first major 
mass media attention in 1999 when an anonymous couple ran an 
advertisement in elite college newspapers offering $50,000 for the 
eggs of a tall woman with SAT scores over 1400.127  As many 
commented at the time, most egg “donors” are perhaps more 
accurately referred to as “vendors.”128  However, others, including the 
24, 2004 (restricting ART such that Italy has one of the least permissive approaches 
to ART of any western country, in part because it defines “embryo” from the moment 
of fertilization). 
 125. The essential question is whether one can have a property interest in one’s 
own body or body part.  This debate has been raging for centuries.  Compare Donna 
M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue:  A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human 
Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
257 (2004) (critiquing the market-inalienability approach to proprietary interests in 
human tissue, arguing for recognition of property rights in one’s own body, and 
proposing a hybrid approach combining the donative and liability-based systems), 
with Wancata, supra note 22, at 201–12 (discussing this debate, analyzing the relevant 
case law, and arguing in favor of the inalienability of the human body and its 
component parts). 
 126. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Highlights from the 62nd Annual Meeting of 
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (2006) [hereinafter ASRM, 
Highlights]; see also Claudia Kalb, Baby Boom:  The $50,000 Egg, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 
1999, at 64 (reporting that some highly sought donors—“intelligent, athletic” 
individuals at Ivy League colleges—have been offered up to $50,000 in 
compensation). 
 127. Kalb, supra note 126, at 64 ; Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg 
Donor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at A10; Irene Sege, A $50,000 Dilemma on Campus, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1999, § 1, at 1. 
 128. Kalb, supra note 126, at 64. 
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ASRM, argue compensation should be given for a donor’s time, 
discomfort and effort.129
Is the donor paid for her time and hassle or for her eggs 
themselves?  There is support for both arguments.  In favor of 
classification as payment for services rendered, most fertility clinics 
define their fees according to a variety of services, not products.130  
Also, an egg donor is usually paid regardless of the number or quality 
of eggs extracted from her, though an unsuccessful cycle (not 
resulting in conception) sometimes results in a reduction in the 
amount paid.131  ASRM guidelines require that payment not be 
contingent upon successful egg retrieval or the quantity or quality of 
the eggs.132  So, unlike surrogacy agreements, in which money is 
arguably exchanged for an actual child,133 payment for human eggs is 
not contingent upon the birth of a child.134  Therefore, it probably 
does not violate the public policy against baby-selling. 
On the other hand, because egg donation payments are arguably 
made for the eggs themselves, rather than the service rendered, 
courts might find human eggs to be marketable products.  In support 
 129. See Ethics Comm., Compensation, supra note 22, at 305 (asserting that 
compensation for egg donation is ethically justified, and “should be structured to 
acknowledge the time, inconvenience, and discomfort associated with screening, 
ovarian stimulation, and oocyte retrieval,” but that compensation “should not vary 
according to the planned use of the oocytes, the number or quality of oocytes 
retrieved, the number or outcome of prior donation cycles, or the donor’s ethnic or 
other personal characteristics,” and it should not exceed $10,000). 
 130. For example, a Chicago-based fertility clinic explains on its website how its 
$23,200 IVF fees break down:  $13,050 is the agency’s fee for matching couples with 
donors, $2,800 is an administrative donation cycle fee, $350 is for extra medical 
insurance, $7,000 is the donor’s compensation, and $3,000 is for the donor’s medical 
treatment.  Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago, Egg Donation Cost, 
http://www.advancedfertility.com/eggdonationcost.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). 
 131. See, e.g., ADVISORY GROUP, GET THE FACTS, supra note 26, at 21–22 (noting that 
“some (but not all) programs provide partial compensation” when a cycle fails to 
result in conception). 
 132. Ethics Comm., Compensation, supra note 22, at 305. 
 133. Compare Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation:  Work for Hire or the Essence of 
Motherhood?  A Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 91 (2002) 
(comparing the permissibility of gestational surrogacy payment under Israeli, 
American and Jewish law, and concluding these arrangements subjugate the interests 
of the surrogate under any system), with Jennifer L. Watson, Note and Comment, 
Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb:  Should Surrogate Mothers Be 
Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529 (2007) 
(arguing for payment of gestational surrogates). 
 134. Similarly, surrogacy contracts are void because they violate the strong public 
policy against baby-selling if payment is in any way contingent upon or variable 
according to the successful birth of the anticipated child.  For example, Florida’s 
adoption code includes the following surrogacy provision:  “A preplanned adoption 
agreement shall not contain any provision . . . [t]o reduce any amount paid to the 
volunteer mother if the child is stillborn or is born alive but impaired, or to provide 
for the payment of a supplement or bonus for any reason.”  FLA. STAT. § 63.213(3)(a) 
(2007). 
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of this side of the argument, the more desirable a donor’s genes 
are—manifested in attractiveness, athleticism, SAT scores, et cetera—
the more she receives in payment for donating eggs at many 
agencies.135  This suggests payment is actually for the genes 
themselves, rather than the services of the girl from whom they are 
harvested. 
The position of state legislatures concerning similar classifications 
is informative regarding how states may handle classification of egg 
donation.  Surrogacy contracts are unlawful in more than a few states 
because of the feared commodification of children (baby-selling).136  
Louisiana, uniquely, takes the extreme approach that even the sale of 
unfertilized gametes is baby-selling, and thus has banned all payment 
for eggs.137  In keeping, in adoption, any payment to assume legal 
control of a child is clearly unlawful.138  Blood shield statutes, on the 
other hand, expressly classify blood as non-products.139  However, 
sperm is readily bought and sold, as indicated by some courts’ refusal 
to consider sperm donors to be patients of the clinics they transact 
with.140  Sperm also falls easily within the definition of “regenerative” 
tissue, which is exempted from the ban on the sale of body parts in 
several states.141
By comparison, egg donation is clearly not analogous to surrogacy 
or adoption—an unfertilized human egg is not a child, nor is 
conception guaranteed from mere completion of a donation cycle.  
Eggs are also unlike sperm because they are not regenerative human 
 135. See, e.g., Terri Yablonsky Stat, ‘Premium’ Human Eggs Unsettling Practitioners, 
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2006, at Q8 (describing the egg donation industry’s reaction to 
the ethical issues raised by some women’s eggs being considered more valuable than 
others based on education, proven fertility, or ethnicity). 
 136. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing a New Jersey Supreme Court decision 
invalidating a surrogacy contract based on that state’s public policy against baby-
selling). 
 137. See supra Part I.C (noting that, while various states regulate artificial 
insemination, sperm donation, and surrogacy, only Louisiana directly regulates egg 
donation). 
 138. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing legal regulation of adoption). 
 139. See supra Part I.D.4 (examining blood shield statutes, and noting that many of 
them are not limited to blood, but rather apply to all human tissue, which arguably 
includes human gametes). 
 140. E.g., Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000).  See 
generally Wancata, supra note 22, at 220–23 (using economic theory to explain the 
discrepancy between the compensation paid for the sale of sperm and the amount 
given to egg donors, and noting women have a fixed number of eggs, whereas sperm 
regenerates). 
 141. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f(c)(1) (West 1999) (Defining “human organ” 
as including “a human kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, or any other human 
organ or nonrenewable or nonregenerative tissue except plasma and sperm”). 
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tissue.142  The same is true of a comparison with blood.  Despite the 
market incentives created by such high compensation, human eggs 
are arguably included in the broad “human tissue” language143 of 
many blood shield statutes, which bar classification of blood donation 
as a sale of goods.144
However, though availability of human eggs is emotionally 
important for some, it is not medically imperative for many,145 so the 
public policy underlying blood shield statutes is inapplicable to egg 
donation.  Some courts refuse to extend the statutes’ protections to 
cover defendants not specifically intended by the enacting 
legislatures, which were exclusively concerned with blood supply.146  It 
follows that, though some blood shield statutes could be interpreted 
to classify egg donation as a service, given the public policy impetus 
for their enactment, courts may well refuse to interpret these 
perceived “luxury”147 goods to be within a legislature’s intended 
scope.148
Thus, unless legislatures act to classify egg donation as a non-sale 
rendition of a service, it is likely that a recipient parent or egg 
donation child will at least try to seek recovery under a product 
liability or UCC theory for a disease inherited from the egg donor.  
On balance, as will be discussed below, egg donation will probably be 
treated as a service by a reviewing court on policy grounds, denying 
use of either theory against an egg donor for failure to warn. 
 142. See Wancata, supra note 22, at 200 (contrasting between the nearly “limitless 
supply” of sperm and the “restricted . . . supply” of eggs). 
 143. See supra Part I.D.4 (describing blood shield statutes).  See generally Pieplow, 
supra note 114, at 622–25 (discussing three different types of blood shield statues 
enacted in different jurisdictions). 
 144. Though inclusion of human eggs within the scope of blood shield statutes 
has not been thoroughly analyzed to date, the analogous issue of sperm’s potential 
inclusion is analyzed in McIntyre, supra note 20, at 529–30 & nn.57–59, in which the 
public policy behind blood shield statutes is applied to an analysis of sperm donation 
liability under product liability theories. 
 145. See, e.g., Lynette Reid et al., Compensation for Gamete Donation:  The Analogy with 
Jury Duty, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 35, 37–38 (2007) (rejecting the 
notion that egg donation is a public service by comparing it to jury duty). 
 146. See, e.g., J.K.B. v. Armour Pharm. Co., 660 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) 
(denying the defendant pharmaceutical company protection under Indiana’s blood 
shield statute because the statute’s enumeration of banks, storage facilities, and 
hospitals implied the legislature intentionally omitted pharmaceutical companies 
from the statute’s protective scope when interpreted using standard rules of statutory 
construction). 
 147. Because of the tremendous costs associated with IVF and egg donation, 
totaling thousands of dollars, these ARTs are usually not accessible to less than 
wealthy individuals or couples. 
 148. McIntyre makes this argument for semen’s exclusion from blood shield 
statutes’ coverage.  McIntyre, supra note 20, at 530. 
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1. Product liability 
If eggs are commodities, then egg donors may be liable for defects 
just as a manufacturer is subject to product liability.  Product liability 
places the burden of liability on a product’s manufacturer as a matter 
of public policy; producers are in the best position to discover 
dangerous defects in their products, so the burden of protection, 
including a duty to warn, is better placed on their shoulders than 
upon those of the uninformed consumer.149  Producers and sellers are 
also better equipped to bear the cost of discovering and fixing 
defects, as well as the cost of remedying injuries caused by their 
products.150
To succeed under a traditional product liability theory, a consumer 
must show he was injured by a product defect present at the time of 
manufacture, about which he was not adequately warned, regardless 
of any care exercised by the manufacturer.151  As the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts explains, someone “engaged [commercially] in the 
business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or 
distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm . . . 
 149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:  NEGLIGENCE § 402A cmt. c (1998) 
(“[J]ustification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing 
his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special 
responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; 
that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it 
needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will 
stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental 
injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who 
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance 
can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum 
of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those 
who market the products.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) 
(justifying product liability as a means “to insure that the costs of injuries resulting 
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on 
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect 
themselves”). 
 151. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (2004).  Maine’s products liability statute 
is a typical example: 
One who sells any goods or products in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject 
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to a person whom the 
manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably have expected to use, 
consume or be affected by the goods, or to his property, if the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling such a product and it is expected to and 
does reach the user or consumer without significant change in the condition 
in which it is sold.  This section applies although the seller has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product and the user or 
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller. 
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998) (defining several 
categories of product defect); 63 AM. JUR. 2D PROD. LIAB. § 517 (2007) (providing an 
overview of strict liability for product defects). 
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caused by the defect.”152  The Third Restatement includes a product 
liability provision that extends the duty to warn to cover defects the 
seller learns of after the sale.153  However, the seller must or should 
know of the risk, otherwise a duty to warn cannot exist,154 and the 
seller must be able to identify those to whom a warning should be 
given.155  Also, the risk of harm must be sufficiently great to justify 
imposing a duty to warn on the seller, the warning must be feasible 
and able to be acted upon, and a consumer must be reasonably 
assumed not to otherwise know of the risk.156  One limitation is that 
the producer must be commercially engaged in the regular activity of 
making or selling the product in question.157  Importantly, because 
the contracts governing egg donation sever all rights and 
responsibilities between the donor and eggs,158 privity of contract 
between the buyer and seller is not required.159
If human eggs are products, and thus donors are producers, the 
elements of a failure to warn prima facie case are likely met.160  Egg 
donors do produce eggs, which they sell to recipients for foreseeable 
fertility purposes.  If those eggs carry a genetic disease, then they are 
defective for their intended purpose, and the danger is a potentially 
crippling illness or even death.  Of course, this is also true of sperm 
and blood donation, though a product liability action has never 
 152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998). 
 153. Id. § 10. 
 154. Id. § 10 cmt. c. 
 155. Id. § 10(b). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. § 2 cmt. a; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:  NEGLIGENCE § 402A 
cmt. f (1965) (noting that strict liability for harms caused by a defective product only 
applies to a person “engaged in the business of selling” the product). 
 158. The contractual provisions severing any relationship between the egg donor 
and the eggs harvested from her are critical components of the egg donation process 
that serve to protect the recipient parents and any ensuing egg donation children 
from future conflicts of parentage.  See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing defenses available 
to an egg donor in an action based on the donor’s failure to warn of the possibility of 
a genetic disease).  Without such a termination of any and all relationship, the donor 
might later assert parental rights.  Id.  The effect of these contracts on future liability 
of the kind analyzed in this comment will be discussed in greater detail in Section 
II.B.1–2. 
 159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS:  NEGLIGENCE § 402A(2)(b) (1965). 
 160. The elements are only probably met because the element of causation is 
difficult to prove when the egg, which then grew into the child, was always a carrier 
of the genetic disease, and therefore the injury was arguably not caused by donor’s 
failure to warn of the preexisting defect when she became aware of it.  See infra Part 
II.B.1.c (providing a more detailed discussion of the difficulties of proving 
causation). 
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successfully been brought against a sperm donor, and blood shield 
statutes bar such actions against blood donors.161
However, as a threshold matter, even if human eggs are marketable 
goods, egg donors are not often “engaged in the business” of selling 
or otherwise distributing them.162  Though there are rare cases where 
a single donor has sold her eggs as many as twelve times, most donors 
donate no more than once or twice.163  It is therefore unlikely that a 
product liability action could prevail against an egg donor, except in 
the extremely rare case of abnormally frequent donations. 
2. Defenses available to the egg donor 
Several defenses are readily available to a defendant egg donor in 
this situation.  First, a manufacturer is not liable for a failure to warn 
if the danger is “open and obvious” or “readily ascertainable.”164  
Here, the risks of reproduction are commonplace and commonsense; 
birth defects and complications during pregnancy and labor are 
universally understood to be inherent in human reproduction.165  
Certainly the danger of genetic disease is no greater when conception 
is achieved through egg donation.166  As such, the risk that a child 
may have a disorder is arguably open and obvious, and is thus not 
actionable under a product liability theory. 
Second, a manufacturer is not liable if the consumer is better 
informed, or a “sophisticated user,” which is a corollary to the open 
and obvious defense because a consumer’s experience with the 
product amplifies that which should be open and obvious.167  Product 
liability assumes the manufacturer is considerably more 
knowledgeable in the relevant area than the consumer and is 
therefore better, and more properly able to avert or fix product 
 161. See supra Part I.D.3–4 (discussing the regulation of blood and semen 
donation, including blood shield statutes that insulate blood donors from strict 
liability for damages caused by diseased or defective blood). 
 162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS:  NEGLIGENCE § 402A cmt. f (1965). 
 163. See, e.g., DEREK, supra note 13, at 201 (describing the eleventh cycle of a self-
described egg donation “junkie”). 
 164. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Prod. Liab. § 92 (2007). 
 165. See McIntyre, supra note 20, at 543 (noting the risk of passing on genetic 
disease exists in sexual reproduction, but that situation provides the parties the 
opportunity to investigate the partner’s genetic make-up in advance). 
 166. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 8 (recognizing the dangers inherent to ART 
are also inherent to coital reproduction). 
 167. See, e.g., Koken v. Black & Veatch Constr., Inc., 426 F.3d 39, 45-46 (1st Cir. 
2005) (upholding summary judgment for the defendant manufacturer because the 
plaintiff consumer was a sophisticated user, and the danger posed by a fire blanket 
was open and obvious to a reasonable sophisticated user). 
  
2008] GUARANTORS OF OUR GENES 433 
                                                          
defects.168  Here, however, the egg “seller” is usually less 
knowledgeable than the “consumer,” the recipient parents.169  Egg 
donors are very rarely medical experts.170  This is because the average 
age of donors is approximately twenty-four, many donate in order to 
pay down student loans or credit card debt, and many would not 
donate again for less than the $5,000 initially received.171  Though 
there are exceptions, young, money-motivated donors usually know 
less about egg donation and IVF than the recipient parents, who are 
heavily invested financially, emotionally and medically.172
Further, the recipient couple will know enough about genetics and 
reproduction to have chosen a donor based on her appearance and 
medical history, while the reverse is not true because donors do not 
select recipients.173  The recipient couple is thus, at least arguably, a 
sufficiently sophisticated user of the eggs not to require a warning 
from the egg donor.  Moreover, as the child in this hypothetical suit 
is already at least several years old when the failure to warn occurs, his 
birth parents are exclusively well-situated to be the best informed of 
 168. Cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 63 (Cal. 1962) 
(implying the discrepancy between manufacturers and “powerless” consumers is the 
rationale for holding manufacturers to strict liability for product defects).  
 169. In 2004, IVF with donated eggs was only successful in 50.5 % of transfers, and 
only 30.5 % of the time when the embryos were frozen prior to implantation.  CTR. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 2004 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART) REPORT 81 
(2006).  This fact hints at the number of repeat attempts recipient parents make.  
Furthermore, many intending parents start first trying to use their own gametes 
before turning to donors.  Thus, while a given cycle is usually at most a second 
experience with donating eggs for the donor herself, the recipient parents may well 
be in their fourth or fifth attempt.  E.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) 
(deciding a case in which the divorcing couple underwent ten failed IVF cycles, 
costing over $75,000). 
 170. This statement is qualified only because it is possible that some egg donors 
are medical students or professionals. 
 171. ASRM, Highlights, supra note 126; see, e.g., Carlene Hempel, Golden Eggs:  
Drowning in Credit Card Debt and Student Loans, Young Women Are Selling Their Eggs for 
Big Payoffs.  But Can They Really Make the Right Medical and Moral Decisions When They’re 
Tempted with $15,000?, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., June 25, 2006, at 19 (profiling Jamie 
Galbraith, a repeat egg donor who has donated, in part, in order to earn money to 
pay student loans and a down payment for a house). 
 172. This level of investment is necessarily true given the more than $20,000 a full 
egg donation and IVF cycle costs.  See Bridgewater, supra note 16 (noting the 
significant financial costs involved in IVF).  Though reliable statistics have not been 
accumulated, and because success rates vary tremendously based on a multiplicity of 
factors, many intending parents undergo several cycles before successful conception 
and birth, as shown in the fact that IVF success rates are at best 50%.  CDC, SUCCESS 
RATES, supra note 33, at 17.  For further discussion of IVF success rates, see supra note 
169 and accompanying text. 
 173. See, e.g., HELANE S. ROSENBERG & YAKOV M. EPSTEIN, THE AMERICAN SURROGACY 
CENTER, INC., EGG DONATION:  PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCES OF RECIPIENTS 1 (1996), 
http://www.surrogacy.com/Articles/news_view.asp?ID=46. (discussing the in-depth 
psychological analysis and corresponding factors weighed in selecting an egg donor). 
  
434 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:405 
                                                          
his health.174  Therefore, the donor can assert that she does not owe a 
continuing duty to warn, because the recipient parents are better 
informed than she is, and are sophisticated users. 
Third, the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, applicable in medical 
contexts,175 would likely intercept the egg donor’s liability for failing 
to warn the egg donation child of her subsequently discovered 
genetic disease.  The doctrine indemnifies medical manufacturers 
from liability for failing to warn patients about a product if the 
manufacturer informs an expert directly in the supply chain, and 
upon whom the patient relies.176  So, a pharmaceutical company is not 
liable for harm caused by failing to warn a patient-consumer about a 
drug it produces if the company warned the doctor who prescribed 
the drug to the patient.177
In this case, the egg donation agency and fertility clinic are learned 
intermediaries, and they are substantially more informed than either 
the egg donor or the recipient parents.178  Also, both the donor and 
the parents reasonably rely fully on the medical expertise of the 
agency and clinic.179  All screening is done by one of these 
intermediaries, as is the aspiration surgery, the selection of eggs, the 
fertilization, and the implantation.180  At least one court has found 
that an agency has a fiduciary duty.181  It follows that warnings about 
genetic defects possibly carried by the eggs should be given by the 
fertility clinic or agency rather than the egg donor. 
Lastly, the danger must be an unreasonable one for liability to 
attach to a manufacturer or seller for not warning a consumer.182  Egg 
 174. Obviously, a child’s parents are most familiar with his medical history and 
needs as they are uniquely positioned to observe him from birth and on a day-to-day 
basis. 
 175. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that 
for a manufacturer to discharge its duty to warn by informing a knowledgeable party 
in the supply chain, and thereby be able to assert the doctrine of learned 
intermediaries as a defense, it “must be able to reasonably rely on the intermediary 
to warn the ultimate user”). 
 176. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of Learned-
Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5TH 1 (2007). 
 177. Id. 
 178. This is true of any professional vis-à-vis his patients or customers because that 
relationship involves one party’s dependence on another’s skill and expertise, and is 
thus the principle underlying why professionals are held to a higher duty of care 
than lay people.  See infra notes 198–199, 202 and accompanying text. 
 179. See infra Part II.B.1.a (questioning whether an egg donor owes a duty of care 
to a child born as a product of the donor’s egg). 
 180. See supra notes 1–3 (providing an overview of IVF and other forms of ART). 
 181. See Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding the surrogacy 
agency had a fiduciary duty to protect the parties). 
 182. E.g., McIntyre, supra note 20, at 534–37 (explaining the unreasonably 
dangerous requirement and applying it to an analysis of a sperm donor’s liability 
under a product liability theory, and arguing that mandatory consent forms ensure 
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donors are normal members of the population at large with no 
distinguishing characteristics other than their choice to donate, so 
the risk of their carrying a genetic disease is no higher than any other 
individual and thus the risks of conception through egg donation are 
no more unreasonable than those posed by traditional human 
reproduction. 
Most importantly, holding an egg donor to a continuing duty to 
warn under a product liability theory demands that she guarantee her 
genetic make-up.  Just as strict liability in tort holds manufacturers 
liable for any dangerous, injury-causing defect, regardless of care 
taken, strict liability, if applied to egg donation, would mandate that 
egg donors foresee the unforeseeable.  Given genetic 
unpredictability, which remains despite the availability of gene 
mapping and genetic tests, the hypothetical child conceived with a 
donated egg subsequently discovered to carry a genetic defect 
probably will not recover under a product liability theory.183
3. Implied warranties of fitness and merchantability 
The UCC governs sales of goods by merchants, so if eggs are 
classified as a marketable good and egg donors are considered 
merchants,184 then egg donation would fall within the UCC’s scope.185  
The UCC, adopted in every state, requires that goods “pass without 
objection in the trade under the contract description; and . . . are fit 
for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that description are 
used.”186  However, for these requirements to apply, the seller must be 
“a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his 
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to 
the practices or goods involved in the transaction.”187
Certainly, adoption and surrogacy are not governed by the UCC, 
because payment cannot lawfully be made for children.188  Blood 
donation is governed by blood shield statutes that specifically bar use 
consumers of donated sperm know of the possibility of genetic or birth defects, but 
may not know the degree of danger faced). 
 183. See supra Part II.A (discussing whether human eggs may properly be 
considered commodities for the purpose of applying principles of strict tort liability). 
 184. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1986) (“[A] warranty that the goods shall be 
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with 
respect to goods of that kind.”). 
 185. Cf. McIntyre, supra note 20, at 528–33 (analyzing the application of the 
implied warranty of merchantability to sperm donation). 
 186. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), (c). 
 187. Id. § 2-204. 
 188. See supra Part I.D.1 (indicating that a surrogacy contract was invalided and 
that adoption statutes prohibit the sale of babies). 
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of implied warranties in actions against blood donors or banks.189  
Sperm donation is analogous to egg donation, except that sperm is a 
regenerative bodily product, so sperm donors can more easily be 
considered persons dealing in their body’s “product.”190  Egg donors 
rarely donate more than a few times and have little expertise 
compared with other parties to the transaction.191  Therefore, it is 
unlikely an egg donor could be a dealer in eggs, so the UCC is likely 
inapplicable. 
Furthermore, if warranties attach to the sale of human eggs, then 
egg donors will have to guarantee that their “product” is fit for 
creating a child who does not suffer from a genetic disease.  At the 
current level of genetic expertise, this is impossible.  However, the 
egg donation child might bring a negligence action against the donor 
for failure to warn him of her inheritable genetic disease once she 
was diagnosed. 
B. Negligence 
To prove a prima facie case of negligence, the egg donation child 
must prove the egg donor owed him a duty of care, which she 
breached, and her breach actually and proximately caused his 
injury.192  Each of these elements presents discrete challenges to the 
prospective egg donation child’s case. 
1. The prima facie negligence case 
a. A duty of care 
At common law, a person owes no duty to affirmatively act to 
protect another from danger not caused by his own action or 
inaction, unless a special relationship exists between the two people, 
such as a parent-child relationship or that between a doctor and 
 189. See supra Part I.D.4 (noting that the donation of blood is classified as a service 
and not a good because of public policy implications and national need for blood for 
medical reasons). 
 190. Men can sell sperm weekly over periods of years.  See, e.g., Wancata, supra 
note 22, at 221–22 (illustrating how the donation of sperm is a market commodity); 
cf. McIntyre, supra note 20, at 531–33 (explaining that characterizing sperm as a 
commodity is resonant of baby-selling, so a plaintiff asserting that sperm is a 
marketable good in order to recover under an implied warranty theory would find 
himself in the “catch-22” of defeating his own theory on public policy grounds). 
 191. The egg donation process is invasive and frequently uncomfortable, and the 
health effects are not yet properly known, so most egg donors are cautioned against 
multiple donations.  See, e.g., ADVISORY GROUP, GET THE FACTS, supra note 26, at 23–24 
(detailing the potential health consequences of multiple donations, and cautioning 
against signing a consent form for multiple donations). 
 192. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2007). 
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patient.193  Thus, there is generally no duty to warn absent a special 
relationship creating an elevated duty of care.194  In the context of 
genetics, the egg donor cannot jeopardize anyone simply by having a 
genetic disease, so there is no affirmative duty to warn absent a 
special relationship.195
In a negligence action brought by the egg donation child, the 
special relationship between him and the egg donor might be 
established either through genetic parentage or under a “risk imports 
relation”196 theory whereby a special relationship is created by the 
magnitude of the harm involved and the fact that the egg donor is 
the only person who could prevent or mitigate that harm.197  The 
former is unlikely to prevail because of the negative public policy 
implications of recognizing, however narrowly, an egg donor as a 
parent.  Conversely, the public policy interests implicated by the 
latter theory may well persuade a court to find a continuing duty to 
warn, and though the egg donation contract severs any legal 
relationship between the parties, it is likely a court would invalidate 
such an absolute agreement as void against public policy. 
 193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).  According to the 
Restatement: 
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent 
him from causing harm to another unless (a) a special relationship exists 
between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor 
to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between 
the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection. 
Id. 
 194. Id. § 314 (“The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his 
part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a 
duty to take such action.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Suter, supra note 18, at 1881 (discussing whether an injury can arise 
from a family member’s disclosure to another family member about having a genetic 
disorder, and noting “[t]heir relatives have no risk of becoming carriers; they only 
have the risk of finding out that they are carriers”). 
 196. The “risk imports relation” theory was articulated by Judge Cardozo in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., and establishes that what constitutes reasonable 
care taken to avert or minimize a risk depends on the nature of the risk as reasonably 
understood by the person with the duty of care, and so the larger the risk the greater 
the duty of care reasonably anticipated by the actor becomes.  162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 
1928) (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk 
imports relation; it is risk to another or others within the range of apprehension.”). 
 197. See generally Matthew Browne, Note, Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted 
Reproduction:  Applying a Nexus Test for Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555, 2555 (analyzing 
the legal and ethical dilemmas associated with finding that someone not yet born, or 
not yet conceived, is nonetheless owed a duty of care, and arguing for tort liability in 
cases of injury to children conceived with ART to be determined based on the 
relationship between the activity causing harm and the harm actually caused). 
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The doctor-patient dynamic is the classic example of a special 
relationship because it is necessarily of the most intimate nature,198 
and the patient submits to the doctor’s care in reliance upon his skill 
and experience.199  Originally, physicians were obligated to inform 
only their patients of possible transmission of contagious or genetic 
diseases to known or foreseeable third parties,200 but they are now 
required to directly warn foreseeable third parties who are not their 
patients.201  These duties to warn arise only because of the special 
relationship, backed by public policy imperatives that individuals 
responsible for life and death operate at a high level of care.202
Similarly, parent-child relationships are characterized by intimacy, 
dependency, and one party’s responsibility for the other.  
Consequently, they give rise to an elevated duty of care.203  However, 
parental status can be severed such that no relationship exists 
between a mother and child.  For example, an adoption agency is not 
considered to owe any duty to warn, especially not a continuing duty, 
to the biological parents of a child relinquished through adoption.204  
 198. See, e.g., Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791, 793–94 (Ky. 1952) (noting that the 
doctor-patient relationship is unique because of the patient’s reliance on the 
doctor’s expertise and the doctor’s duty of good faith towards the patient). 
 199. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (comparing the civil, 
statutory and common law considerations of special relationships characterized by 
dependence by one party on the other that give rise to duties of care). 
 200. See, e.g., Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1995) (mandating that a 
physician warn his patient that the congenital illness suffered from is likely to 
develop in the patient’s children when a reasonably prudent physician would issue a 
warning in the same circumstance). 
 201. Seminally, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California expanded a medical 
professional’s duty to warn to encompass foreseeable third parties known to be at 
risk of danger, even when such a third party is not one of the medical professional’s 
patients.  551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).  The court rejected the traditional rule that no 
duty was owed and reasoned that the doctors’ professional duty of care for the 
patient extended to the foreseeable victim, despite concerns about medical 
confidentiality.  Id. at 343; see, e.g., Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (articulating a new duty to warn not just the patient that 
her genetic disease might affect her children, but also to take reasonable steps to 
warn those third party children themselves).  See generally Susan M. Denbo, What Your 
Genes Know Affects Them:  Should Patient Confidentiality Prevent Disclosure of Genetic Test 
Results to a Patient’s Biological Relatives?, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 561, 580–86 (2006) (tracing 
the development of the duty to warn relatives of genetic disease suffered by patients 
that is the exception to the doctor-patient privilege). 
 202. See, e.g., 61 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 185 (“The welfare of the citizens of a state, 
and therefore of a state itself, demands that those persons practicing medicine and 
surgery must be duly able and careful.”). 
 203. See, e.g., Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to 
Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent’s Negligence—Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4TH 1066 
(2007) (describing the parent-child relationship and the various ways different 
jurisdictions assess the liability of the parent for injury to the child caused by the 
parent). 
 204. See Olson v. Children’s Home Soc’y of Cal., 252 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (Ct. App. 
1988) (finding no nexus between the injury and the actions undertaken by the 
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This is true even when the adoptee dies of a genetic disease that 
future children of the biological parents will also suffer from.205
The complication in an egg donation situation is how one defines 
“parent.”  Traditionally, the biological connection established by 
birth defined “mother.”206  In an egg donation context, a child can 
potentially have five distinct “parents” through biological, genetic 
and social relationships.207  In the few cases in which egg donation has 
been a factor, starting with Johnson v. Calvert,208 courts have struggled 
with how to assign relative weight to genetic relationships versus 
biological and social ones.209  In that case, the court recognized both 
genetic and biological maternity under the UPA, but declined to rule 
the child had two mothers.210
As indicated in Johnson, the genetic relationship between the egg 
donor and the egg donation child is substantial enough to create at 
least a quasi-parental relationship that may give rise to a duty to 
warn.211  The nature of this relationship could only be a parent-child 
relationship, unless a court chooses to carve out a distinct genetic 
basis on which a duty to warn can be premised.  Yet, courts have 
almost invariably recognized the parental rights of intending parents 
over those of genetic parents.212  The California Supreme Court’s 
rationale for this preference, in Johnson, was that the intent to bring 
the child into existence, manifested in the surrogacy agreement, 
served as a tiebreaker between the two versions of maternity.213  Many 
scholars have argued that this preference for intent-based family 
adoption agency, and thus no special relationship giving rise to a continuing duty to 
warn), review denied, No. S007860, 1988 Cal. LEXIS 308 (Cal. Dec. 22, 1988). 
 205. Olson, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 12. 
 206. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 524 (noting that, traditionally, “familial bonds 
[were] predicated on, and [were] understood to flow from shared biogenetic 
substance”) (footnote omitted). 
 207. Cf. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) (overturning the 
trial court’s determination that out of the pool of potential parents, including the 
anonymous sperm and egg donors, the intending mother and father, and the 
gestational surrogate, the baby in question had no parents at law). 
 208. 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993). 
 209. See supra Part I.B (analyzing the limited cases addressing egg donation in the 
context of custody disputes arising out of breaches of surrogacy agreements). 
 210. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 n.8. 
 211. Id. at 781. 
 212. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 534–35 (analyzing cases in which courts have 
considered competing claims of maternity, and concluding that courts have 
exhibited a “startling readiness to displace completely the biogenetic component of 
family bonds as courts expressly privilege parental intention over biological 
connections in determining maternity”). 
 213. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (“Because two women each have presented 
acceptable proof of maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without 
enquiring into the parties’ intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement.”). 
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structure is part of a general societal trend toward recognition of 
choice as the ultimate determining factor.214
If a court decides to impose a duty to warn on the hypothetical egg 
donor, it will probably not be on the basis of a special, genetic parent-
child relationship.  Courts are loath to recognize two mothers at law, 
and they clearly favor recognition of the intending parent over the 
egg donor or surrogate.215  Presumably, as is the case with adoption 
policy, protecting the best interests of the child requires providing 
the certainty and stability that comes from preventing legal confusion 
over parentage.216  It follows that a court would likely shy away from 
recognizing any parental relationship between an egg donor and an 
egg donation child. 
Further, in support of reserving parentage for the intending 
parents, egg donation contracts manifest a clear demarcation of legal 
parentage over any ensuing children.  In this way, they mimic 
adoption statutes.217  Nonetheless, as the willingness to void surrogacy 
contracts on public policy grounds indicates, if policy interests 
outweigh an egg donor’s interest in enforcing the contract to avoid 
liability, a court would likely void the contract.218  One practitioner in 
the area of reproductive law notes that “it is important to explain to 
client couples that they cannot necessarily rely upon [enforcement 
 214. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, “Planned Parenthood”:  Adoption, Assisted 
Reproduction, and the New Ideal Family, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 85, 89–90 (1999) 
(commenting on the controlling role intent plays in various alternative reproduction 
situations); Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed:  Definition Motherhood in the 
Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 504–05 (1996) (noting 
national polls show a preference for intent-based determinations of parentage); 
Dolgin, supra note 3, at 542 (noting that the trend in the law is part of a greater 
sociological trend in which “[b]iology becomes less important as contract and its 
correlates (choice, intention, and promise) become more important”).  See generally 
Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation:  Unscrambling the 
Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265 (1995) (describing the role of 
intent in egg donation situations and applying the “intent” test to various parentage 
scenarios). 
 215. See supra Part I.B (supporting the public policy concern that intending 
parents serve a child’s best interests). 
 216. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 83, at 610–11 (calling for clear determinations 
of legal parentage to govern assisted reproduction situations in the way adoption is 
regulated); Manning, supra note 14, at 711–16 (discussing the adoptee’s entitlement 
to stability through clear legal parentage determinations).  See generally Vanessa S. 
Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies:  Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of 
Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 439 (2004) (analyzing the best interests of the 
child in gestational surrogacy agreements). 
 217.  See supra Part I.D.2 (comparing adoption and egg donation because the 
child in each situation is genetically related to its biological parent but the intending 
parent assumes all legal rights and parental duties). 
 218. Cf. Vorzimer, supra note 13, at 417 (noting no California court has enforced a 
surrogacy contract exactly, but have rather “considered the contract in an attempt to 
adduce the parties’ intentions upon entering into the reproductive arrangement”). 
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of] their surrogacy contract.”219  Though surrogacy edges closer to 
baby-selling than egg donation, the best interests of the child are still 
at issue.  Thus, an egg donation contract impeding those interests is 
possibly void.220
Nonetheless, liability might attach to the egg donor for failing to 
warn her offspring under a “risk imports relation” theory.221  
Essentially, this principle extends a duty of care to reasonably 
foreseeable persons.222  Moreover, it suggests that the greater the 
magnitude of a given danger, the more reasonably and readily it 
should be perceived, and perception of the danger creates—
imports—a relationship giving rise to a duty of care. 
In this situation, the egg donor discovers she has a hereditary 
genetic disease, but she does not warn her offspring.  Knowledge that 
a disease is hereditary reasonably triggers thoughts of transmission to 
children, which arguably would include any possible egg donation 
children.  Therefore, the egg donation child is foreseeable.  Also, the 
magnitude of the danger is substantial because the disease might be 
life threatening.  Thus, once the egg donor realizes the risk that her 
children will inherit her disease, a duty to warn might develop 
between her and the egg donation child. 
b. Breach 
Once a duty of care is established, negligence analysis requires a 
finding of breach of that duty.223  Failure to actually warn the egg 
donation child is not a per se breach of the egg donor’s duty of care 
because only reasonable effort is required.224  For example, if the egg 
donor were denied contact information by the egg donation agency 
when she called in search of the recipient couple, her duty of care 
 219. Id. 
 220. But cf. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 534–36 (Or. 
1985) (permitting a biological mother to sue the birthing physician who divulged 
her identity to a daughter she put up for adoption, because the doctor-patient 
relationship created an implied contract of secrecy which he breached, causing her 
injury).  But see Lynn M. Squillace, Note, Too Much of a Good Thing:  Toward a 
Regulated Market in Human Eggs, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 135, 146 (2005) 
(arguing that the only grounds on which an egg donation contract should be 
determined are principles of contract law, because any other approach inherently 
implies that women need protecting because they are not able to knowingly and 
voluntarily enter into a contract). 
 221. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (indicating that reasonable care 
must be taken to avert or minimize a risk, and that what is reasonable care depends 
on the severity of the risk). 
 222. E.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 963 
(2005). 
 223. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 130 (2007). 
 224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. b (1965). 
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would probably be satisfied.225  It might even be reasonable for the 
donor to feel bound by the privacy provisions of the egg donation 
contract that, for the sake of the recipient couple and the child’s 
stability and privacy, mandate contact not be made.226  However, if a 
court decides to find a duty to warn on public policy or “risk imports 
relation” grounds, it is likely it would also find that substantial effort 
to warn the egg donation child is reasonable by virtue of the 
magnitude of the pending harm.227
c. Causation 
Causation is an extremely complicated factor in cases of genetic 
disease because, by definition, the plaintiff is born with the disease-
bearing genes in question.228  Consequently, the egg donor’s failure to 
warn neither causes nor changes anything.229  Yet, to make a prima 
facie case for negligence the egg donation child must prove he would 
be healthy but for the egg donor’s negligent failure to warn him of 
her hereditary disease.230  Logically, this threshold requirement can 
 225. The egg donation agency and the fertility clinic that facilitated the egg 
donation process are bound by a fiduciary and medical confidentiality duty to all 
parties.  See, e.g., Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the 
surrogacy agency served as a broker between the parties, and therefore had a 
fiduciary duty to protect the parties).  In adoption situations, disclosure of the 
identity of the biological parents is actionable if there is a state statute that closes 
adoption records, or if disclosure breaches the duty of medical confidentiality.  Cf. 
Humphers, 696 P.2d at 530–36 (analyzing an invasion of privacy claim against a doctor 
who disclosed the biological mother’s identity to the daughter, who was relinquished 
through adoption, and holding that breach of confidentiality controlled in the 
circumstances, but not deciding whether informing the daughter constituted breach 
when she was a party to the birth). 
 226. The donor may subject herself to liability if she breaches the privacy 
provisions in the egg donation contract, but neither courts, scholars, nor 
practitioners have yet analyzed this question.  But see Squillace, supra note 220, at 
146–47 (arguing for application of contract law principles to egg donation contract 
issues). 
 227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965) (indicating that what is 
reasonable in a given set of circumstances can be determined by legislative or 
administrative action; by a court applying a legislative or administrative action; by a 
prior judicial decision; or, in the absence of any such legislative, judicial, or 
administrative action, by the trial judge or jury looking at the facts of the case). 
 228. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 58, at 13–14 (describing the complication the 
issue of causation presents in preconception tort liability cases as the “paradox of 
offspring harm”). 
 229. See Denbo, supra note 201, at 577 n.70 (distinguishing the duty to warn in 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), from warning of 
genetic disease because “[o]nce the patient with a genetic disorder has reproduced, 
the potential harm already exists in the patient’s child,” so the notion of special 
relationships articulated in the Restatement is inapplicable to genetics situations) 
(citing Michelle R. King, Physician Duty To Warn a Patient’s Offspring of Hereditary 
Genetic Defects:  Balancing the Patient’s Right to Confidentiality Against the Family Member’s 
Right To Know—Can or Should Tarasoff Apply, 4 QUINNAPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 31 (2000)). 
 230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(c) (1965). 
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only be met if the genetic disease in question is one that could have 
been averted or mitigated through caution or preemptive medical 
care.231  If the disease was definitely going to manifest in the child, 
then the failure to warn caused nothing more than a delay in 
discovery of the disease.  Illnesses that arise from a combination of 
genetic predisposition and lifestyle choices, and are thus preventable 
in some circumstances, include, for example, type II diabetes and 
certain types of cancer.232  Only in these cases would a failure to warn 
have any effect on the egg donation child’s health.233
However, if poor habits and lifestyle choices can also cause the 
disease, regardless of any genetic predisposition, the egg donation 
child will face the evidentiary hurdle of proving his own actions did 
not substantially contribute to the disease’s onset.234  Known as the 
Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, this affirmative defense 
prevents recovery for injury caused by the negligent act of another 
when the plaintiff’s own negligence is also a substantial cause of the 
injury.235  Some jurisdictions have rejected this “all-or-nothing” 
approach in favor of a comparative fault analysis, under which the 
plaintiff will recover if he is less responsible for causing his own injury 
 231. An example of a hereditary genetic disease that can be averted through 
lifestyle choices or preemptive medical treatment is diabetes.  MARIA MCCARREN, AM. 
DIABETES ASS’N, A FIELD GUIDE TO TYPE 2 DIABETES 4–8 (2004).  Type II diabetes can 
potentially develop in anyone, but is frequently caused by strong hereditary 
predispositions coupled with unhealthy lifestyle choices.  Id.  So, if the egg donor 
finds out she is diabetic twenty years after donating eggs, her failure to warn her 
genetic offspring could easily result in the egg donation child not taking preventative 
dietary and exercise measures to avoid developing diabetes himself.  See, e.g., Denbo, 
supra note 201, at 565–71 (describing the various types of genetic tests and noting 
that testing positive for a genetic predisposition does not mean one will become ill in 
later life). 
 232. For example, diabetes is a disease resulting from the body’s under-
production (type 1) or misuse (type 2) of insulin, a hormone that is essential for the 
conversion of sugar into energy.  MCCARREN, supra note 231.  Though the exact 
cause is unknown, both genetic predispositions and environmental factors, including 
poor diet and obesity, are known to contribute to the development of adult-onset 
diabetes.  Id.  The disease is frequently fatal because of complications, such as 
diabetic eye disease, and nerve and kidney damage.  Id. 
 233. Cf. Robertson, supra note 58, at 15 (“A key point about the paradox of non-
wrongful life is that the person could not have been born without the condition of 
concern.  If so, refusing the act or omission that causes the child to be born with that 
condition cannot harm the child.  Of course, if changes in technique or treatment 
protocols could reduce the frequency of the condition, there would be an obligation 
to adopt those changes.  However, in situations in which no improvement can be 
made one cannot show that the child has been harmed as a result.”). 
 234. See, e.g., 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 797 (2007) (“Contributory negligence is 
the breach of the duty of the plaintiff to exercise due care for his or her own safety in 
respect of the occurrence about which he or she complains, and if the plaintiff’s 
failure to exercise due care for his or her own safety is one of the proximate 
contributing causes of his or her injury, it will bar recovery.”). 
 235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 477 (1965). 
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than the defendant.236  As the donor will assert contributory or 
comparative negligence as an affirmative defense, she will have the 
burden of proving the child did not take reasonable steps to protect 
his own health.237  The egg donation child will have the burden to 
prove his condition would have been avoidable or treatable if he had 
known about his genetic predisposition at the time the egg donor 
learned of her disease.238
More practically, the child may not have access to information 
needed to prove causation, because the donor’s medical 
confidentiality interest might be deemed weightier than the child’s 
need for discovery.239  In adoption situations, children are generally 
granted access to their biological parents’ medical information for 
good cause.240  This is a balancing test that weighs the relative 
interests of the parties.241  Even life or death needs for medical 
information may not suffice to establish good cause if the likelihood 
or size of the benefit is less than the public policy interest in medical 
confidentiality.242  Conversely, one court has held that a sperm donor 
is not a patient of a sperm bank, so medical confidentiality does not 
apply.243  However, because egg donation is so much more 
complicated than sperm donation, and requires considerable medical 
oversight,244 it is very unlikely a court would hold that an egg donor is 
not a patient of her fertility clinic.  Therefore, the egg donor is 
 236. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 954 (2007). 
 237. See id. § 940 (stating that a defendant raising the defense of contributory 
negligence must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to 
exercise due care). 
 238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965) (“The burden of proof 
that the tortious conduct of the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is 
upon the plaintiff.”). 
 239. See, e.g., In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614, 621–23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (balancing 
privacy interests against the adoptee’s need to obtain medical information about his 
biological parents in order to find a bone marrow donor, and deciding the 
unlikelihood of finding a match rendered the adoptee’s interest less compelling than 
the parent’s privacy interest). 
 240. See, e.g., id. (analyzing whether the adoptee has shown good cause to access 
his biological parents’ records). 
 241. See, e.g., id. at 621 (“What is to be balanced then is the factual need and the 
policy against disclosure.”). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 872, 879 (App. Ct. 2000) 
(ordering disclosure by a sperm bank of a donor’s records because the donor was not 
a patient of the sperm bank). 
 244. See, e.g., Katers, supra note 62, at 447–48 (describing some of the 
inconveniences and dangers present in egg donation that are not present in sperm 
donation); Wancata, supra note 22, at 221 (contrasting the time and effort 
commitments of egg donation and sperm donation to explain why sperm donors 
make as little as $45 compared to the $5,000 compensation paid to egg donors). 
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entitled to medical confidentiality, which may prevent the egg 
donation child from proving that the donor was negligent. 
Given the difficulty of proving causation, it is more likely an egg 
donation child would bring suit against the egg donation agency and 
fertility clinic for failure to adequately screen egg donors.245  In other 
words, it may be an insurmountable hurdle for the child to prove 
causation in an action against the donor for negligent failure to warn.  
However, because the magnitude of the injury is great, and the egg 
donor is the only person who could possibly have warned the child, it 
is nonetheless possible a court would impose liability on the donor on 
public policy grounds. 
d. Injury 
As a logical outgrowth of the difficulty of proving causation, 
determining whether the egg donation child has suffered an injury 
presents metaphysical as well as legal complications.246  The recipient 
parents cannot bring a wrongful birth claim because the alleged 
failure to warn occurred after their choice to conceive, but the egg 
donation child may bring a wrongful life action,247 though proving 
injury will usually be impossible.  Certainly, if the egg donor has 
caused nothing by failing to warn her offspring, she also cannot have 
caused any injury.  More specifically, if the child’s genetic disease was 
present at birth, even in latent form, it is not an injury at all.248  As the 
egg donation child is born with the defective gene, his claim is, in 
 245. This is because a failure to adequately screen a donor is more easily proven 
than a failure to warn, by virtue of the elevated duty of care the doctors are held to.  
See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1992); 
Part II.B.1.a (explaining the special doctor-patient relationship that creates an 
elevated duty of care). 
 246. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity Policy Choices:  Obesity and the Struggle Within 
Ourselves, 3 GEO. L.J. 1335, 1357–58 (2005) (discussing the considerable obstacle 
presented by the element of causation in failure to warn actions brought against food 
manufacturers and providers about the danger of weight gain, cardiovascular disease 
and diabetes). 
 247. A wrongful life claim is brought by or on behalf of the child, while a wrongful 
birth claim is brought by the parent for the loss of the choice not to conceive or to 
terminate the pregnancy.  E.g., Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995) 
(distinguishing a wrongful birth action brought by the parent when medical 
negligence has deprived her of preventing or terminating the pregnancy from a 
wrongful life action brought by the child who argues that it would be better were he 
not alive and thus he should be compensated for having to be so). 
 248. See, e.g., Suter, supra note 18, at 1881 (discussing whether an injury can arise 
from a family member’s disclosure of a genetic disorder to another family member, 
and noting “[t]heir relatives have no risk of becoming carriers; they only have the risk 
of find out that they are carriers”). 
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effect, that he should recover the difference between a life without 
the defective gene and his actual life.249
Courts have handled “wrongful life” cases carefully for this 
reason.250  They usually decline to hold that life with a disability is 
worth less than life without one, and thus they deny recovery for 
 249. As a further complication, calculating damages would require a court’s brave 
metaphysical determination of the value of life with a genetic defect versus value of 
life without such a flaw. Even if the child can prove negligence, the fundamental 
philosophical question remains of how one calculates damages in such a situation; 
how can anyone measure the value of life unimpaired versus life with a genetic 
disease?  See generally Roger Brownsword, Genomic Torts:  An Interest in Human Dignity 
as the Basis for Genomic Torts, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 428 (2003) (describing the 
impossibility of such a valuation).  This task is somewhat simplified here because the 
child cannot bring a wrongful life or wrongful birth action because the disease only 
became known to the egg donor herself after the child had already been born to the 
recipient parents.  See supra Part II.B.1.c–d; see also Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711 
(Minn. 2004) (finding for the parents when a doctor negligently failed to warn them 
their next child might carry the same disorder as their first); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 
764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the 
doctor when he negligently misdiagnosed the patient child’s blindness as non-
hereditary, and that diagnosis was relied upon by the parents in conceiving a second 
child who was also blind).  But see Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805 (N.J. 1999) 
(calculating compensatory damages for the wrongful birth of plaintiff as the 
emotional harm caused to the parents plus special medical expenses from raising an 
impaired child, but not the impairment itself). 
Here, the breach of the duty to warn occurs after the egg donation child’s birth.  
Thus, though the similarity is limited to calculation of damages, this hypothetical 
case is thus more akin to a failure to warn of a contagious disease; a doctor’s failure 
to warn a patient of the transmission potential of her illness that results in the 
infection of foreseeable third parties.  E.g., Safer v. Estate of Pack, 667 A.2d 1188, 
1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (extending a doctor’s duty to warn of a 
hereditary predisposition to his patient’s children when they were easily identifiable, 
because there is no “essential difference” between contagious and genetic disease 
when future harm “may be averted or minimized by a timely and effective warning”). 
In cases where a doctor’s failure to warn results in crippling illness, the cause of 
action is more similar to standard medical malpractice than wrongful life.  See Becker 
v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (defining wrongful life, wrongful birth and 
wrongful conception actions as “sound[ing] essentially in negligence or 
malpractice”).  Thus, because the breach in question occurs after the birth of the 
child in this hypothetical situation, damages would be measured according to 
standard negligence remedy principles.  The remedy afforded a party alleging 
negligence on the part of someone who owed them a duty of care is compensation; a 
prevailing plaintiff in a negligence action recovers the amount needed to put him in 
the position that he would have occupied if not for the defendant’s negligence.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1965).  Compensatory damages can be 
awarded for both physical injury and mental anguish.  Id. § 905.  If the injury 
suffered results in ongoing impairment that prevents the plaintiff from engaging in 
work, inter alia, he may also recover for any foreseeable future earnings lost.  Id. § 
910 cmt. b.  So the egg donation child in this case could recover the amount needed 
for medical treatment of the genetic disease he would have been able to avert had he 
been warned.  He would also be able to recover for his mental suffering, but the 
amount would vary depending on the harm actually suffered by a given egg donation 
child.  See infra note 255.  See generally Norton, supra note 58, at 818–43 (applying 
economic damages, noneconomic damages, offsets for benefits and mitigation, 
foreseeable damages, and speculative damages). 
 250. See supra note 247 (explaining the difference between wrongful life and 
wrongful birth causes of action). 
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illness or disability with which the child is born.251  In the words of the 
New York Court of Appeals: 
 Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have 
been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly 
to be left to the philosophers and the theologians.  Surely the law 
can assert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view 
of the very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind 
has placed on human life, rather than its absence.252
Consequently, the egg donation child bringing this action could 
only make a prima facie case for negligence if the egg donor’s 
unforthcoming warning would have permitted prevention or 
mitigation of his illness.253  The child must be able to assert that the 
illness is an injury because it began after his birth, rather than 
claiming that his genes were defective. 
It is more likely that the recipient parents could prove their own 
injury.  Of course, the parents’ action must overcome higher hurdles 
to prove the existence of a special relationship giving rise to a duty to 
warn between the egg donor and themselves because that 
relationship lacks the essential genetic link present between the egg 
donor and the egg donation child.254  If they are able to prove the 
duty element of negligence, however, the parents may be able to 
assert that the burden of paying for the sick child is a legally 
cognizable injury.255
 251. E.g., Greco, 893 P.2d at 347–48.  See generally Robertson, supra note 58, at 14–19 
(discussing why wrongful life actions will likely not prevail in cases in which children 
are conceived through ART and are also thereby injured, such that they are born 
with birth defects caused by the fertility clinic’s medical negligence). 
 252. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (explaining why New York’s 
highest court refuses to allow a cause of action for wrongful life). 
 253. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 15 (describing the “paradox of non-wrongful 
life” implicated in preconception torts claims, and recognizing that no action can lie 
unless the injury is one that could have been prevented or lessened). 
 254. See supra Part II.B.1.a (detailing the types of relationships that have been 
sufficient to establish a duty of care, including a parent-child relationship and a 
doctor-patient relationship). 
 255. Only a few states have allowed recovery by parents for special damages 
incurred as a consequence of their child being born disabled.  See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 
513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986) (holding that damages are appropriate for actions for 
wrongful birth for tangible losses, but not intangible losses like emotional distress); 
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 808–14 (permitting 
special damages for the cost of caring for the child during its minority because such 
damages arise from the negligence of the defendant).  See generally Robertson, supra 
note 58, at 18–19 (explaining that the three states that recognize a special damages 
exception to the bar on wrongful life recovery do so only because the special 
damages for care of the child ends when the child reaches majority). 
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2. Defenses available to the egg donor 
If the egg donation child succeeds in making a prima facie case for 
negligent failure to warn, the egg donor will be able to assert both 
affirmative and public policy defenses.  These include contributory or 
comparative negligence, assumption of risk by the recipient parents, 
and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine.  Additionally, the donor can 
argue that the importance of protecting medical confidentiality 
trumps competing interests, and that imposing liability on the 
grounds of even a quasi-parental relationship opens the door to egg 
donors asserting parental rights. 
Whether the egg donor asserts contributory or comparative 
negligence depends upon which jurisdiction the egg donation child 
brings the action in.256  Contributory negligence is a doctrine under 
which the plaintiff is barred from recovery completely if he also acted 
negligently and thereby contributed to the cause of his own injury.257  
Most states find this common law rule too strict, and have opted for a 
comparative fault determination that allows for recovery when the 
plaintiff’s negligence was less than the defendant’s.258  The defense of 
comparative negligence only succeeds when the plaintiff’s own act or 
omission substantially contributes to his injury.259
In this case, the egg donor will have the burden of showing the egg 
donation child’s acts or omissions are sufficiently responsible for the 
development of his disease that he should not be able to impose 
liability on her.260  Evidence may include anything suggesting the 
child did not take reasonable measures to look after his own health.261  
 256. Only four states and the District of Columbia completely bar recovery if the 
plaintiff has contributed to the negligence causing his injury.  57B AM. JUR. 2D 
Negligence § 956 (2007) (Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia). 
 257. Id. § 797. 
 258. Id. § 954. 
 259. For example, in Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, a pharmacist negligently gave the 
plaintiff the wrong cancer medication.  2000 ME 63, 748 A.2d 961.  The plaintiff was 
generally active and self-sufficient prior to taking the wrong medicine.  Id. at ¶ 18, 
748 A.2d at 968.  She took the wrong drug for three weeks, without a check-up or 
blood test, and it was so strong it caused major deterioration in her condition.  Id., 
748 A.2d at 968.  Wal-Mart argued the plaintiff’s failure to read the prescription 
bottle or to get a blood test during those three weeks contributed to the injury and 
broke the chain of causation.  Id. ¶ 20, 748 A.2d at 969.  The court found this 
argument unpersuasive because the plaintiff had no way to know the medication she 
was given was not the prescribed one, so her inaction was not a substantially 
contributing cause.  Id. ¶ 22, 748 A.2d at 969. 
 260. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 851 (2007). 
 261. Analogously, in a famously derided case against McDonald’s, customers 
argued deceptive marketing practices caused them to eat the restaurant’s food, 
become obese, and develop diabetes.  Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 
512, 538–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), amended complaint dismissed, No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15202 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2003), vacated in part and remanded, 396 F.3d 508 
(2d Cir. 2005) (finding the plaintiffs were entitled to a greater finding of fact by the 
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For example, if the disease in question is adult-onset diabetes, the egg 
donor could offer evidence showing the child was obese, maintained 
a poor diet, rarely had medical check-ups, and rarely exercised, all of 
which are environmental factors in the development of the disease.262
Here, the hypothetical egg donation child had a genetic 
predisposition toward the disease, but no certainty it would ever 
develop.263  Therefore, joint causation is at issue.  If the child engaged 
in habits comparable to eating McDonald’s twice a day, his diabetes 
might have been sufficiently caused by his own behavior that the egg 
donor’s failure to warn did not constitute a substantial factor in the 
cause of his illness. 
The defendant egg donor may also invoke an assumption of risk 
defense.  Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense when the 
plaintiff, explicitly or implicitly, knowingly and voluntarily assumed 
the danger posed by a risky activity.264  All reproduction creates the 
risk of birth defects,265 but genetic disease does not fall in that 
category.  Without a doubt, the recipient couple relied upon the 
fertility clinic’s screening measures, so it cannot plausibly be asserted 
district court).  The plaintiffs admitted to eating McDonald’s twice a day as many as 
five times a week during school.  Pelman, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202, at *31–33.  
Because they failed to address genetic and environmental factors, the plaintiffs failed 
to “isolate the particular effect of McDonald’s foods on their obesity and other 
injuries,” and could not prove causation, so the complaint was dismissed.  Id. 
(dismissing the complaint because “[p]laintiffs have failed . . . to draw an adequate 
causal connection between their consumption of McDonald’s food and their alleged 
injuries”).  Quoting its previous dismissal the district court explained: 
[T]o allege that McDonald’s products were a significant factor in the 
plaintiffs’ obesity and health problems, the Complaint must address these 
other variables and, if possible, eliminate them or show that a McDiet is a 
substantial factor despite these other variables.  Similarly, with regard to 
plaintiffs’ health problems that they claim resulted from their obesity . . . it 
would be necessary to allege that such diseases were not merely hereditary or 
caused by environmental or other factors. 
Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 539. 
 262. The American Diabetes Association estimates that “[j]ust 30 minutes a day of 
moderate physical activity, coupled with a 5–10% reduction in body weight, 
produced a 58% reduction in diabetes.”  Am. Diabetes Ass’n, How To Prevent 
Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-prevention/how-to-prevent-diabetes.jsp 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2007). 
 263. As discussed in Part II.B.1.d, if the disease was definitely going to develop, the 
egg donation child could not prove causation or injury from the donor’s failure to 
warn. 
 264. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). 
 265. See McIntyre, supra note 20, at 543 (noting the risk of passing on genetic 
disease is present in sexual reproduction, but that situation provides the parties the 
opportunity to investigate the parents’ genetic make-up in advance). 
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that they knowingly assumed the risk of the egg donor passing on a 
genetic disease to their child.266
Discussed in Part III.A.3, the Learned Intermediary Doctrine limits 
a medical manufacturer’s duty to warn customers to informing 
experts upon whom the consumer reasonably relies.267  In this case, 
both the egg donation agency and the fertility clinic are such experts, 
because they posses the medical expertise and they serve both the 
recipient couple and the donor in a fiduciary capacity.  Thus, if the 
donor informs either of the learned intermediaries, the agency or 
clinic, she has probably satisfied her duty to warn the egg donation 
child. 
The egg donor also has at least two strong public policy arguments 
in her defense.  First, the issue of medical confidentiality is very much 
implicated in the negligence case prospectively analyzed here.  The 
duty to maintain a patient’s confidence dates back as far as 400 B.C., 
when the Hippocratic Oath was first recorded.268  Most states have 
statutes protecting medical confidentiality.269  The duty of doctors to 
maintain the doctor-patient privilege is necessary to ensure a 
patient’s ability to speak freely and disclose all information needed 
for treatment.270  However, doctors may disclose patient information 
with impunity when it is necessary to protect the public from the 
spread of disease or to protect a patient’s family.271
In sperm donation situations, the sperm donor has been held not 
to be a patient within the meaning of the doctor-patient privilege.272  
Thus, the sperm donor is not entitled to medical confidentiality.273  In 
contaminated blood donation cases, donors’ privacy interests are 
usually considered less important than the tremendous public 
 266. Cf. id. at 541–43 (analyzing the defense of assumption of risk when a genetic 
disease is passed from an anonymous sperm donor to a child conceived with his 
sperm, and concluding that it would be unsuccessful in that situation). 
 267. See Kane, supra note 176 (concluding that a medical manufacturer reasonably 
delegated its duty to warn to a third party who had purchased the drug). 
 268. See Suter, supra note 18, at 1871 (explaining that the Oath expresses a 
physician’s moral obligation “to maintain confidentiality in the physician-patient 
relationship”). 
 269. See Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA:  A Foundation for a 
Federal Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 507 (2004) (finding forty states 
and the District of Columbia recognize the doctor-patient privilege). 
 270. See, e.g., Denbo, supra note 201, at 572 (discussing the history and purpose of 
medical confidentiality rules). 
 271. See id. at 574 (noting that a majority of states mandate disclosure in the case 
of child abuse or neglect, gunshot wounds or contagious diseases). 
 272. See, e.g., Johnson v. Super. Ct., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000) (ordering 
disclosure by a sperm bank of a sperm donor’s medical records, but protecting his 
identity). 
 273. See id. at 872 (concluding that the physician-patient privilege has no 
application in the case of this sperm donor). 
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interest in maintaining a safe and adequate national blood supply.274  
Also, communicable diseases fall within the permissible exceptions to 
doctor-patient medical confidentiality.275  Confidentiality is most fully 
recognized in the adoption setting, where medical data of biological 
parents can usually be accessed only upon a showing of good cause.276
In this case, unlike a sperm donation situation, the egg donor is 
likely a patient of the fertility clinic and egg donation agency because 
of the extensive medical oversight the egg donation process 
requires.277  Therefore, she is entitled to the protection of medical 
confidentiality.  Further, as the child is born with the predisposition, 
it is likely a court would conclude that the potential benefit to be 
gained by disclosing the donor’s medical information is outweighed 
by the donor’s interest in medical confidentiality.278
A second public policy defense, and perhaps the more persuasive, 
is that the egg donor can argue that imposing liability on her for a 
negligent failure to warn would be contrary to the law’s preference 
for reinforcing traditional family structures.279  The argument is that 
any recognition of a duty the egg donor owes the child implicitly 
opens the door to claims for rights and parental privileges, and courts 
have consistently favored legal fictions that protect traditional notions 
of family.280  This preference was clearly illustrated in Gerald H. v. 
Michael D.,281 in which the Supreme Court upheld a California statute 
mandating, as an irrebuttable presumption, that a child born into 
 274. See Hopkins, supra note 110, at 145–46 (arguing for donor’s privacy interests 
in blood donation contamination litigation). 
 275. See, e.g., Denbo, supra note 201, at 572 (explaining the rationale for the 
doctrine of physician-patient confidentiality, but noting that a physician can reveal 
confidential communications when required by law). 
 276. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing state regulation and case law regarding 
adoption, including the circumstances in which various states allow the opening of 
sealed adoption records). See generally Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, 
Reproductive Technologies, and Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 126 (1998) 
(assessing whether genetic history should be available to children born through ART, 
and being unable to “think of any legal reason why such information should be 
disclosed,” but easily thinking “of any number of social reasons why it should not be 
revealed”). 
 277. See supra Section II.B.1.c (reasoning that a physician assumes the duty to warn 
his patient). 
 278. Cf. In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614, 621–23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding the 
benefit outweighed by the biological father’s privacy interest when disclosure was 
unlikely to produce a bone marrow donor match for the adoptee). 
 279. See, e.g., Richards & Wolf, supra note 8, at 527–34 (discussing the law’s 
preference for preserving the traditional family, even though changing social and 
reproductive trends render the preference a legal fiction frequently at odds with 
reality). 
 280. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 3, at 528–34 (analyzing cases where paternity 
conflicted with presumptions of paternity). 
 281. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
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marriage is the child of both members of the marriage, even when a 
paternity test would definitively prove otherwise.282  This presumption 
also exists at common law.283  In fact, courts are usually so eager to 
reinforce traditional family structures that a double standard exists 
regarding paternity;284 even when a father is demonstrably not the 
biological father of a child, courts may sometimes force him to pay 
child support,285 yet a biological father may be denied parental rights 
if those rights impede upon the sanctity of a traditional family.286  The 
purpose of such paternity presumptions is to ensure that children are 
provided for and to escape traditional notions of illegitimacy.287
Here, the hypothetical egg donation child is fully provided for by 
his actual, intending parents, so that impetus for holding the egg 
donor to a duty of care is absent.  Thus, egg donation is most like 
adoption, because responsibility for the child is fully assumed by new 
parents.  However, even more than in an adoption case, the recipient 
parents are the only parents the egg donation child has ever had, 
because all the donor provided were unfertilized eggs.  In fact, one 
would presume that intending parents often choose ART instead of 
adoption in order to have children who are more fully their own.  
Therefore, the imperative in adoption, that the full legal transfer of 
 282. Id. 
 283. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:  WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 2.5 cmt. c (1998) (“A child born to a married woman is presumptively the genetic 
child of the woman’s husband.”).  This common law presumption was intended to 
protect children from being declared illegitimate.  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 
COMMENTARIES *457.   
 284. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 563 (discussing the conflict between traditional 
constructs of family and the realities of modern families, including those created by 
multiple marriages, divorces, gay and lesbian relationships, and assisted reproductive 
technologies, and noting the contradictory results this conflict creates in paternity 
suit outcomes). 
 285. E.g., Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (applying 
estoppel principles in refusing to admit DNA evidence, proving the mother’s ex-
husband was not the biological father of the child born during their marriage, in 
order to require the ex-husband to continue paying child support, even though the 
wife had instituted a child support suit against a third party).  See generally Richards & 
Wolf, supra note 8, at 427–34 (discussing putative and legal fathers’ rights regarding 
marital children). 
 286. E.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (upholding a statute barring introduction of 
DNA paternity tests into a custody suit when the evidence would disturb the married 
couple and its traditional family structure); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) 
(rejecting a biological father’s effort to block the adoption of his child by the 
mother’s husband, even though she married the adopting father after the child’s 
birth). 
 287. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 527–28 (explaining the presumption as a way to 
help children avoid hardship). 
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the child creates stability and normality, is intrinsic in the egg 
donation process itself.288
Imposing a duty on the egg donor allows for the possibility that the 
donor could assert rights over the egg donation child.  Not only 
would such a possibility directly impede the imperative of stability 
and normality, but it would also buck the trend in the law favoring 
intention as the ultimate determination of parentage.289  The court in 
Johnson refused to conclude the child had two mothers, one 
biological and one genetic: 
 The Calverts are the genetic and intending parents of their son 
and have provided him, by all accounts, with a stable, intact, and 
nurturing home.  To recognize parental rights in a third party with 
whom the Calvert family has had little contact since shortly after 
the child’s birth would diminish Crispina [Calvert]’s role as 
mother.290
This logic should control an egg donation child’s suit against the egg 
donor for failing to warn him of his genetic predisposition.  Here, the 
recipient parents are half the genetic parents of the child, the 
intending mother is also the biological (birth) mother, and they are 
also the intending parents.291  The egg donor does not even have the 
biological link created by birth upon which Anna Johnson’s claim of 
maternity was founded.292  Certainly, recognizing parental rights in an 
egg donor rather than a gestational surrogate, an even more distant 
third party, would diminish the recipient and intending parents’ 
parental status.293
III. LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Notwithstanding the conclusion reached in the analysis in Part II, 
above, the possibility remains that a court might hold an egg donor 
liable for latent genetic diseases passed to an egg donation child after 
finding either that eggs are commodities, and thus the donor is a 
seller, or that there is a special relationship between the donor and 
 288. Cf. Anderson, supra note 83, at 610–11 (“Adoption statutes are very clear 
regarding the termination of birth parents’ legal rights and responsibilities.”); 
Manning, supra note 14, at 711–16 (discussing an adoptee’s entitlement to stability 
through clear legal parentage determination). 
 289. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 542 (describing the courts’ justification for 
protecting traditional family structures because families are “moral units” in need of 
protection). 
 290. 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (Cal. 1993). 
 291. This genetic ratio assumes the intending father’s sperm was used to fertilize 
the donor’s egg, though the sperm may well be from an anonymous donor as well. 
 292. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779 (stating that Anna Johnson gave birth to the child). 
 293. Id. at 781 n.8 (arguing that there is no reason to accept that a child has two 
mothers in this situation). 
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the child creating a duty to warn.  It is critical that the type of 
litigation analyzed in this Comment be preempted by proper 
legislation, and that the free-for-all that defines the egg donation 
industry be reined in.294  Thus, following a discussion of the various 
interests in need of protection, this section proposes comprehensive 
regulation. 
The competing interests are varied.  Regulation should protect egg 
donors, recipient parents, and the children born from donated eggs.  
In opposition to a donor’s privacy interest, the children born with 
donated eggs must be assisted in the treatment and prevention of 
disease through access to the medical records of their donor 
parent.295  Egg donation children must also be guaranteed protection 
against genetic diseases they cannot avoid through stringent 
screening measures that filter out donors who carry genetic 
diseases.296  Donors must be sure anonymity will be preserved and 
must be confident they will never be found to be the lawful parents of 
any children their eggs may ultimately create.297  On the flip side, 
intending parents and their families need protection from the 
possible intrusion of an egg donor asserting parental rights.298
First, to protect egg donation children, the possibility of birth with 
a genetic disease should be minimized by adoption of strict screening 
 294. Calls for regulation are not new.  See Anderson, supra note 83, at 620–26, 
(proposing comprehensive legislation to govern ART); Horstmeyer, supra note 63, at 
693 (proposing a rule requiring a birth mother to state before the procedure that 
she does not wish gamete donors to have parental rights over the child); Katers, supra 
note 62, at 466 (arguing for “nuclear-family traditionalism” for ART legislation); 
Squillace, supra note 220, at 146–50 (applying contract and property law principles to 
egg donation regulation).  But see Baum, supra note 13, at 162–66 (arguing free 
market principles should govern egg donation instead of restrictive regulation to 
maximize procreative liberty and recognition of freedom of contract).  Students at 
the University of Iowa drafted a model ART Act in 2005.  Sara Cotton et al., Model 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, 9 GENDER RACE & JUST. 55, 55 (2005).  The 
American Bar Association has also published model ART guidelines.  MODEL ACT 
GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 1 (Proposed Draft 2006) (revised 2007). 
 295. For calls for full access to sperm and egg donors’ medical information, see 
Baines, supra note 17, at 118–20 (balancing the child’s right to know his own genetic 
background with the donor’s right to anonymity and the recipient parent’s right to 
have the fact of assisted reproduction kept secret, and arguing for the same access 
extended to adoptees to be extended to children born of donated eggs or sperm); 
D’Orazio, supra note 17, at 253 (arguing for access to medical records given the 
importance of such information for making health decisions). 
 296. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 10–11 (describing the risk of transmission of 
genetic disease without proper screening). 
 297. For a discussion of the danger of being found to be a lawful parent faced by 
egg donors, see Crews, supra note 44, at 154 (critiquing K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.2d 673 
(Cal. 2005)). 
 298. Cf. In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (permitting the biological father 
of a child conceived with his donated sperm to seek parental rights when he and the 
mother might have agreed not to extinguish his parental rights). 
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standards for egg donors.  Currently, the Food and Drug 
Administration requires that donors undergo a basic blood test for 
communicable diseases.299  A limited number of states also have 
screening requirements that are limited to communicable diseases.300  
Furthermore, to best protect egg donation children, they should have 
the same access to the genetic information of their egg donors that 
adoptees have to their biological parents’ information for good 
cause.301
Second, egg donors must be protected against product liability 
actions by classification of human eggs as non-products.  Just as blood 
shield statutes have blocked such actions in the context of blood 
donation, egg donors should not be held to the high standards of 
product liability.302  Blood shield statutes permit actions for 
negligence and misrepresentation, and egg donation law should as 
well.303  Furthermore, donors must also be confident they will never 
be found responsible for parental duties. 
Most importantly, the duty of care should be placed squarely onto 
the egg donation agencies and fertility clinics.  These companies 
profit tremendously from ART.304  They possess the medical expertise, 
they solicit infertile couples who want their own children, and they 
serve as brokers between and agents for the parties.305  Therefore, the 
burden of screening donors for hereditary genetic disease and 
selecting embryos free from genetic defects properly belongs to the 
egg donation agencies and fertility clinics.  Though critics of 
extensive pre-donation genetic screening might argue the cost would 
 299. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting the minimal regulation of 
donor screening in most jurisdictions). 
 300. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:14 (2007) (“No gamete shall be used in 
an in vitro fertilization or preembryo transfer procedure, unless the gamete donor 
has been medically evaluated and the results, documented in accordance with rules 
adopted by the division of public health services, demonstrate the medical 
acceptability of the person as a gamete donor.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.3 (2007) 
(“Any person using donor gametes . . . [for] artificial insemination, in vitro 
fertilization, . . . or other intervening medical technology using sperm or ova, shall, 
prior to using any donor gametes for such procedures, ascertain the HIV status of 
the donor through testing as provided in Board of Health regulations.”). 
 301. See Manning, supra note 14, at 716 (“Even those states that do not allow 
complete access to adoption records recognize the importance of access to genetic 
medical history . . . .”). 
 302. See Part I.D.4 (discussing blood shield statutes, and noting their possible 
applicability to other human tissue, including gametes). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Cf. MUNDY, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that pharmaceutical companies make 
approximately $3,000,000,000 per year from sales of fertility drugs and medical 
devices used in ART procedures). 
 305. Cf. Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding a surrogacy 
agency to a fiduciary duty of care). 
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be prohibitive, an intending couple that is already paying over 
$20,000 to have a child of their own would likely consider ensuring 
that child’s future health warrants this precautionary step.  
Regardless, egg donors, who are arguably the least informed party in 
an egg donation transaction, should not be forced to bear burdens of 
care they are ill equipped to meet.306
Given all these competing interests, states should adopt the revised 
2002 Uniform Parentage Act provision that specifically bars 
recognition of gamete donors as legal parents,307 and should add 
additional provisions to protect the other interests at play.  First, the 
UPA provision that should be adopted states that “[a] donor is not a 
parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”308  
Adoption of this provision would protect the donor, the intending 
parents, and the egg donation child by preserving the family 
structure from multiple and conflicting parental claims. 
Second, the additional regulation should include a statute 
modeled on the adoption statutes that grant access to parents’ 
medical information, without revealing the parents’ identities, upon a 
showing of good cause.309  Consequently, states should also adopt 
regulation that requires adequate record keeping of egg donors’ 
medical information by the egg donation agencies and fertility clinics 
so that egg donation children can access their genetic histories if and 
when they show good cause. 
Third, states should adopt regulation that specifically classifies egg 
donation as a service, thereby preventing invocation of the UCC or 
product liability law by plaintiff egg donation children. 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, high minimum screening 
standards should be also mandated, with the duty and burden of care 
placed on the skilled shoulders of the egg donation agencies and 
fertility clinics so all parties are protected.310  With this genetic 
information available before the egg donation process commences, 
intending parents should also be able to—and required to—give truly 
informed consent, waiving the liability of the donor for any future 
 306. See supra Part II.A.1 (critiquing the idea of applying principles of product 
liability as a means of imposing a duty to warn on egg donors). 
 307. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).  
See supra Part I.C. (providing further information about the history and current state 
of the UPA). 
 308. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702. 
 309. See supra Part I.D.2 (noting the circumstances in which sealed adoption 
records may be opened). 
 310. This could, perhaps, take the form of amendments to the Fertility Clinic 
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992.  42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).  See supra note 12 
and accompanying text (discussing the frequency and success rates of IVF). 
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medical issues faced by the egg donation child.311  Critically, this 
regulation should prohibit egg donation procedures and transactions 
unless licensed medical professionals—the fertility clinics—have 
conducted threshold screening for latent genetic disorders. 
CONCLUSION 
Infertility is a tragedy that affects a considerable percentage of the 
population.312  ARTs offer a solution for an increasing number of 
people, but the legal, ethical and practical consequences have not yet 
been worked out.  Currently, the near absolute lack of regulation 
necessarily turns every case in which egg donation is at issue into an 
ad hoc determination of parentage.313  Thus far, the question of 
whether the anonymous egg donors, whose eggs permit so many 
parents to have children, retain an ongoing duty of care to protect 
their offspring has not been answered.  As this Comment has argued, 
legislation must be passed to protect egg donors from being held to a 
continuing duty to warn.  Statutes that balance the competing 
interests in play should preempt suits similar to the hypothetical 
action analyzed here.  Most importantly, the egg donation industry, 
and the fertility industry in general, desperately needs regulating so 
that a situation in which an egg donation child is born with disease or 
defective gene does not ever arise. 
 
 311. For a discussion of informed consent in egg donation situations, see Barbara 
L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 591 (2006) 
(addressing the parameters of informed consent in the new situations alternative 
reproductive medical procedures present). 
 312. CDC, SUCCESS RATES, supra note 33, at 1 (reporting that fifteen percent of 
American women will seek infertility treatment in their lives). 
 313. E.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (using parental intent 
as a tiebreaker between a birth and genes to determine parentage). 
